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ABSTRACT
IS BIG BROTHER PLAYING FAIR? EXPLORING EFFECTS OF PERCEIVED
NEPOTISM IN PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS ON TRUST IN STRANGERS.

by

NEEQUAYE David Amon

Master of Philosophy

Trust has proven to be a vital social capital. It has been implicated in a myriad of
socially beneficial initiatives. While trust vested in familiar others remain important,
trust extended to strangers is crucial to the continued development of social capital.
This is because such interaction, though risky at times, forms a springboard to
untapped opportunities. Using a multi-round trust game and self-report assessments
the present study explored explanations for observed cultural differences in trust in
strangers. Data was drawn from university students in Ghana and Hong Kong. Factor
analysis showed that self-report trust in strangers was associated with trust in people
of another religion and people of another nationality among Hong Kong Chinese, but
was associated with trust in family members and people whom one knows personally
among Ghanaians. While Hong Kong Chinese students reported higher level of trust
in strangers, Ghanaian students showed higher level of trust in standard behavioural
measure. Perceived nepotism in public institutions explained the observed cultural
difference in self-report trust in strangers. Self-report trust in strangers and perceived
nepotism in public institutions did not relate to behavioural trust in both samples.
However, culture specific results with the behavioural measure indicated that dealing
with a generous or thrifty individual impacted trust significantly. In both samples,
participants dealing with a generous individual showed higher behavioural trust
compared to those dealing with a thrifty individual. These results suggest that the
influence of context on trust is twofold: distal, contextual factors, such as perceived
nepotism in public institutions are influential to the cultural differences in self-report
trust, whereas proximal, situational factors, such as generosity of a stranger, have
more impact on actual trust behaviours. Altogether, this research showed that the
contexts under which people function have substantial impact on trust. Specifically,
individual’s experiences with the government institutions in a sociocultural context
affect their tendency to trust unfamiliar others, but one’s immediate interaction with
another person is more influential to their enactment of trust in a particular situation.
Future research on trust should pay more attention to the effects of contexts,
depending on how trust is operationalized.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Context and trust
Trust forms a very basic fiber of every society regardless of where the analysis
is made. In theorizing the psychosocial stages of human development, Erikson (1950)
postulated that we face eight major conflicts as we age. The first of these conflicts
according to Erikson is trust versus mistrust. This conflict revolves around the
crossroads of infants coming to rely on others to be responsive to their needs
(Sigelman & Rider, 2012). The conflict goes either way according to Erikson and
this depends on how infants are treated by caregivers. The child may come to trust, if
caregivers optimally provide for the child and mistrust if their needs are not well
catered to. Considering a culture or society metaphorically as a child, like in
Erikson’s theory, the question; what drives a culture of trust or mistrust? may be
posed. What factors can be implicated as influencing individuals in a culture to be
trusting or not? What makes people rely on each other to be responsive to each
other’s needs? If Erickson’s model is relied on here as a metaphor, who or what
serves as the caregiver?

1.1. Nepotism in public institutions as a cultural influence on trust
The current work examines public institutions as the potential "caregiver" that
may influence whether individuals come to rely on each other to be responsive to
each other’s needs or not. Is it possible that public institutions create a context that
has consequent effects on attitudes, and how people behave? Social science research
(Rothstein, 2005; Freitag & Buhlmann, 2009; Freitag & Traunmuller, 2009) has
shown that when public institutions are perceived to be fair, immune to corruption,
and egalitarian (i.e. not nepotistic in their dealings) the more individuals, functioning
1

in their domains, are likely to develop trust. The notion here is that widespread
attitudes that individuals direct at others are strongly related to attitudes toward
public institutions. Freitag and Buhlmann (2009) note that interactions that call for
trust do not necessarily have to be based on familiarity. Rather, societies where
public institutions in carrying out their duties, create a fair and egalitarian
environments incentivize individuals toward collaborative behaviour because they
limit the leverage of unpredictable behaviour. Freitag and Traunmuller (2009)
additionally maintain that experiences and predispositions are essential foundations
of trust. This foundation of trust however is still dependent on contexts.

Along the line of contextual influence on trust, the present work explores the
effect of levels of perceived nepotism in public institutions on trust in strangers. The
assumption is that if public institutions in a society are perceived to be fair and
egalitarian (i.e. relatively un-nepotistic), the citizens would be more likely to trust
unfamiliar others. This is so because egalitarian public institutions promote norms of
trustworthiness and intolerance to exploitation. By creating and promoting contexts
that punish exploitation and reward trustworthiness, public institutions attenuate the
risks that may be associated with trusting unfamiliar others. Trusting unfamiliar
others carry added risks in that there is no prior information for predicting these
individuals’ behaviours. Contexts that are quick to punish exploitation and reward
trustworthy behaviour therefore provide some assurance toward safeguarding one’s
interests when trusting strangers.

2

1.2. The Importance of trust vested in strangers
Familiarity often breeds trust, as individuals with whom we have had previous
dealings are predictable. Developing trust in strangers, on the other hand, presents a
hurdle to maneuver since there is no previous information to assess whether these
individuals are trustworthy or not. That notwithstanding trust extended to people
whom we meet for the first time may lead to rewarding and lasting relationships.
Vesting trust in strangers forms the bedrock of social capital. A lack of such social
capital, as Putnam (1993) puts it, may be responsible for the failure in
well-intentioned social policies.

Fukuyama (1995) also argues that trust is vital to societal functioning. In a
general sense it facilitates initiative that involves people stepping out of their comfort
zones and taking action toward resource pooling, business venturing and tolerance. It
then becomes important to explore the nature of trust pertinent to unfamiliar others.
Yamagishi, Kikuchi and Kosugi (1999) note that even though commitment with
familiar others reduces the risk of being exploited by strangers, it inhibits individuals
from trying out new opportunities that may lie outside established relationships.
Established commitments are useful in situations where there is a scarcity of
opportunities

outside existing relationships.

However,

in

an increasingly

cosmopolitan world, breaking out and interacting with unfamiliar others is an
essential prerequisite for greater prospects.

A lot of empirical work has gone into trying to define and accurately measure a
generalized form of trust, which intends to capture the totality of one’s willingness to
trust. Some of these findings may be extended to the discussion on trust in unfamiliar
3

others. The trust question - Generally speaking do you think most people can be
trusted or you think you need to be careful in dealing with people – has been used in
global surveys, such as the General Social Survey (GSS) and the World Value
Survey (WVS), to assess generalized trust.

Even though this approach has spun a

lot of intriguing results, it is saddled with confounds that cannot be ignored.

The first issue that needs to be addressed is the nature of most people. Does
most people include or exclude people known personally? This is especially critical
when trust is studied across cultures. Dehley, Newton and Welzel (2011) found, in a
51-nation study, that the general trust question used in the WVS (2005-2007) had
different associations across cultures. Respondents from some countries associated
the general trust question with in-group trust (trust in family, neighbours and known
others), while other countries associated it with out-group trust (trust in people of
another religion, people met for the first time and people of another nationality). This
finding suggests that people’s self-report generalized trust may be differentially
related to the targets they have in mind when answering the question. Stolle (2002)
also notes that generalized trust extends beyond the confines of face-to-face
interaction to include unknown others. The solution to undertaking a fine analysis of
trust would be to specify the target of trust.

Conceptualizing trust to be target specific eliminates confounds and streamlines
the application of trust research. A step further will be to go beyond self-report
measures and cross validate such data with behavioural measures.

As Fehr,

Fischbacher, Rosenbaldt, Schupp and Wagner (2003) posit, experimental studies are
prone to self-selection and homogeneous samples. Surveys on the other-hand are
4

handicapped by measurement error and questionable behavioural relevance.
Integrating behavioural and self-report measures will cater for the weaknesses of
both methods and increase ecological validity.

The importance of trust in unfamiliar others and its lucid measurement is best
discussed when context variables are considered. Such a discussion provides a
holistic analysis. This is because how individuals behave in a social context speaks to
how such a context has conditioned them. Welch, Sikkink, and Loveland (2007)
remark that the character of a society and its overall culture is best revealed in the
passing exchanges among strangers. One such character of a society concerns how
public institutions relate to the citizens there. The actions taken by the public
institutions are expected to create an enabling or inhibiting environment of trust in
unfamiliar others. These cultural contexts shape trust vested in strangers. When
public institutions foster a fair and egalitarian culture trust in strangers will be
encouraged whereas corrupt public institutions discourage trust in strangers. This is
because cultural contexts that safeguard fairness and equality reduce the risk of
exploitation.

1.1.Research questions
In a nutshell, the present study explores the following research questions in a
bid to contribute to the ever-evolving debate of conceptualizing trust, its antecedents,
and consequential effects on attitudes and behaviour.

1. What are the behavioural and self-report features of trust in strangers? How are
these features related to one another in different cultures?
5

2. Do public institutions create an environment that influence trust in strangers? How
does perceived nepotism in public institutions make a difference in trust in strangers
across cultures?

1.2. Organization of thesis
The present work’s attempt to discuss trust aimed at strangers will be
structured into four main sections. Chapter 2 will examine current literature on trust.
It will scope the background of trust and how culture may influence results from trust.
The role of public institutions in creating a nurturing environment for trust will also
be discussed. It will then delve into debates surrounding definitions and underlying
theories of trust. Though trust is often considered an important element of everyday
functioning, its complexity is often ignored. In light of this the present work will
examine the different aspects of the phenomenon, namely, trust, trust propensity and
trustworthiness.

Another area often glossed over when discussing trust is the influence of trust
referents and how different trust referents may elicit diverse trust response patterns.
Known others for example may elicit relational trust while unknown others may
elicit a rational form of trust. This issue will be addressed by discussing the
multifaceted nature of trust when considering trust referents.

The thesis will then go on to look at how situational determinants are
influential in vesting trust. While disposition and context remain important in the
6

debate on trust, social psychology research has shown that the effects of situation
cannot be overlooked (e.g., Bond, 2013). The author therefore discusses research that
has examined how situation affects trust.

Discussing the background of trust necessitates an examination of its
measurement, because measurements of subjectively defined constructs are vital to
ascertaining the validity of theories formed on such constructs. Since the definition
of trust has not reached a complete consensus yet, it would benefit any examination
to explore how the concept has been measured overtime in relation to its definition.

Chapter 3 will set the tone for expected cultural differences and summarizes
justifications for the hypotheses to be tested. The chapter discusses the impact of
socioeconomic and political climates on trust. Here, the Ghanaian context is
compared to Hong Kong. The methodology section, chapter 4, will lay out
procedures employed to investigate how public institutions influence trust in
strangers. Here operational definitions, research design, measures and general
procedure employed to conduct the study will be discussed.

Chapter 5 will present the analytical strategy and results. In this section
results from self-report and experimental data would be presented. Chapter 6, the
discussion section, will discuss presented results focusing on how findings fit with
current literature. Furthermore methodological and practical implications will be
presented.

7

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

Background of Study
Trust has been researched quite extensively and despite the depth of research,
uniformity, as far as defining the concept is almost elusive. Most theorists agree that
the construct hinges on positive expectations of trustworthiness and willingness to
accept vulnerability (Mollering, 2006; cited in Fulmer & Gefland, 2012). Fulmer and
Gefland go on to describe positive expectations of trustworthiness as that which
generally connotes perceptions, beliefs, or expectations about trustee’s intentions and
being able to rely on the trustee. They further explain willingness to accept
vulnerability as an intention to take risk and depend on the trustee. Trustee here
refers to the entity to which trust is directed. Fulmer and Gefland in their review of
trust literature encourage researchers to be emphatic on the main tenets of their
definition of trust, so as to give a clear picture on what is being discussed and
measured. Most importantly, in my view, they stress the need to delineate the trust
referent with clarity. Muethel and Bond (2013) have also cautioned against lumping
all trust referents as one, in their view this confounds results from cross-cultural
research. This is because collectivistic cultures based on such analysis are examined
as low on trust. However, distinguishing between in-group trust (trust in known
persons e.g. family) and out-group trust a better account is made of findings in
collectivistic cultures as they tend to be high on in-group trust. This finding
highlights the importance of examining the influence of culture on trust.

8

2.1. Culture and trust
Current research indicates marked variability in trust as a result of culture.
Some cultural factors identified as influences on trust include socialisation goals
(Jing & Bond, 2014), diversity (Alesina and Ferrara, 2000), emancipation (Welzel &
Delhey, 2015) and social conflicts, informal social networks as well as life success
(Delhey & Newton, 2003). The present work attempts to examine the influence of
sociocultural context on trust in strangers. Specifically I investigate how perceived
nepotism in public institutions influence trust in strangers. Nepotism revolves around
the practise where individuals or entities with power favour only those they are
familiar with or have vested interests in. Put simply nepotistic individuals or entities
are rather unfair and promote inequality.

Stolle (2002) comments that inequalities that exist in a society may impact trust.
She further asserts that in order for citizens to extend trust beyond familiar others
there should be a climate of minimal inequality. Such egalitarian cultural contexts
that promote trust, as previously discussed, are engendered by favourable
socioeconomic and political climates. Rothstein and Uslaner (2005) in exploring
alternative antecedents (besides participation in voluntary associations) to trust also
suggest that trust is influenced by economic equality, equality of opportunity as well
as actions by governments to reduce inequality. Furthermore they propose that
societies build trust when their political and socioeconomic climates favour
universalistic welfare policies that treat everyone equally rather than a simple
redistribution of wealth. These universalistic policies foster egalitarian climates by
treating everyone in the same situation equally. Thereby leading citizens to perceive
common stakes with each other and consequently an increase in trust. Freitag and
9

Traunmuller (2009) support this view by remarking that institutional arrangements
that promote intolerance to corruption spurs people (citizens) toward trusting and
trustworthy behaviour. This is because such arrangements check exploitative
behaviour hence promoting trust. Freitag and Buhlmann (2009) have also shown that
country features such as levels of corruption, income distribution and representation
(of minorities) in decision-making processes are relevant to recorded levels of trust.
These political and socioeconomic indicators outlined by Freitag and Buhlmann
indicate that widespread corruption, inequitable income distributions and
under-representation of minorities in the decision making process are detrimental to
trust recorded in a society.

In their study, Newton and Norris (2000) discuss three schools of thought that
seek to explain the antecedents of how citizens’ confidence in public institutions is
eroded. As previously examined such perceptions of public institutions are
influential on trust. They implicate the following; social psychological features of
individuals; the cultural environment and governmental performance.

Social psychological features
According to Newton and Norris (2000) this school examines confidence in
institutions as formed as a result of basic aspects of personality types, which are
enduring and heavily influence behaviour. Referring to Erikson (1950) they maintain
that, such personality types (basic trust: trust in others and in oneself) are formed
early in psychological development based on caregiver interaction with the infant.
Some people are therefore likely to be trusting or mistrusting. The crux of the
argument here is that since trust is an affective orientation based on the history of
10

personal interaction within an individual’s sphere of contact, trustworthiness
assigned to institutions by individuals is independent of experiences with such
institutions. Newton and Norris criticize this perspective as providing no explanation
for changes in trust among large portions of a country’s population. They further
note that standard survey questions on the topic reveal attributes of the individual’s
attitude rather than the “world” they live in.

The cultural environment
This school of thought provides an alternative to the social psychological model
(Newton & Norris, 2000). The main tenet here is that trust is a product of social
experiences and socialization. Newton and Norris however, emphasize creating
superordinate goals for different social types. In their opinion this breeds, among
other things, effective and successful public institutions which people can invest
confidence in. In summary they predicted that people who express trust toward
others are likely to express confidence in public institutions as well.

Institutional Performance
This school favours performance of governmental institutions as influencing
confidence rather than personality traits or social conditions (Newton & Norris,
2000). Consequently institutions that perform will rack up more confidence than
those who do not. This reasoning implies three assumptions and is examined follows.
First, confidence in public institutions is an accurate gauge of public life. Second
public institutions may lower expectations of performance in order to improve
confidence. The third assumption is most relevant to the present study. They posit
that institutional performance posits an indirect relationship between confidence in
11

institutions and trust at the national level. The rational here is that estimations of
trustworthiness are based on past behaviour. The current study rests on the
hypothesis that judgments of process i.e. equity and fairness determine such
estimations of trustworthiness not performance. It is worthy to note that Newton and
Norris’s prediction was for a strong relationship at the national level, which was
confirmed in their 17 nation study, and a “not so strong one” at the individual level.

The primary objective of this research is to investigate how public institutions,
by their actions, influence individual's trust-related attitudes and behaviours directed
at strangers. Samples are drawn from two cultural contexts: Ghana in West Africa
and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China.
Ghana and Hong Kong present very diverse cultural contexts on the spectrum
regarding public institutions that are effective and foster fairness as well as equality.
The context of Hong Kong compared to Ghana presents an environment where
fairness and equality are better safeguarded. The World Bank’s Worldwide
Governance Indicators (WGI), (2014) show this wide variability. Public institutions
in Hong Kong compared to Ghana are perceived by citizens to be less yielding to
corruption, enforce the rule of law and are generally more effective. Because these
reports indicate that Hong Kong presents a less nepotistic context compared to
Ghana, it is expected that in the present research Hong Kong will show more trust
compared to Ghana. The WGI indices as well as the United Nations Human
Development Report and how they aid predict expected cultural differences are
discussed further in the research design and hypotheses chapter. This direction of
investigation warrants the examination of the concept of culture

12

Conceptualizing culture
One of the early definitions of culture was set forth by Herskovits (1948; cited
in Smith & Bond, 1999), who posited that culture is the man made parts of a society.
Smith and Bond (1999) provided an analysis for these manmade parts, dividing them
into man-made objects (e.g. houses and transportation) and. Social Institutions (e.g.
marriage), while highlighting that all these “parts” are governed by laws.

The present study favors Hosfstede’s (1980) definition of culture, which
explains culture as a collective programming of the mind within groups. This in my
opinion provides a deft simplification of the concept without losing its
meaningfulness. Culture since times of old has been passed on and spread throughout
a society mostly through socialization. This diffusion of aspects of society to new
members to imbibe forms what Hofstede refers to as ‘collective programming’, that
is, members of a culture are given the appropriate tools to function, by an older
generation, within the culture and this results in a collective way of thinking and
behaviour because the cycle never ends.

It is important to discuss about the relationship between the concepts of society
and national culture. Rohner (1984) defines society as the largest unit of a
territorially bonded, multigenerational population, recruited largely through sexual
reproduction, and organized around a common culture and common social system.
Smith and Bond (1999) propose that the concept of the nation is threatening that of
society as the two are often used interchangeable. They draw attention to the fact that
the concept of a nation is a western one and demarcations are mostly just for political
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expediency. Furthermore they highlight the need to define culture holistically in
order to retain vital elements such as ethnic, racial and linguistic distinctions.

2.2. Creating a trusting environment: The role of public institutions
As one if its main goals, the present study seeks to investigate if public
institutions in their dealings and actions have an influence on individuals’ trust in
strangers or people met for the first time. Current research lends credence to the
notion that when public institutions are perceived as fair and dispassionate in
carrying out their duties (un-nepotistic), they inspire confidence in their agencies.
This confidence then translates into an increase in trust among individuals that
happen to function under their jurisdiction.

Confidence in public institutions is often synonymous to how trustworthy
nationals perceive governmental institutions to be. Levi (1998) points out that trust
or trusting is solely reserved for persons; however trustworthiness can be ascribed to
individuals and institutions as well. Levi goes on to maintain that institutional
trustworthiness connotes measures put in place to ensure that agents of institutions
remain competent, credible and capable. Also these constraints are to make them
more likely to act in the interests of those who have been asked to trust. Therefore
when individuals place confidence in institutions they declare the belief that agents
of such institutions will prove trustworthy. By extension the more individuals
perceive institutions to be acting in their interests the more confidence will be placed
in them, the converse is also true. In examining how public institutions foster
interpersonal trust, Levi makes a point that Van Ryzin (2011) resounds (to be
discussed later). She posits that infrastructure and resources, in other words how well
14

institutions perform, are vital but are by themselves insufficient to produce feelings
of trustworthiness. If individuals doubt how committed institutions are to stick to
laws and if their promises are not always guaranteed then public institutions will be
unable secure confidence and consequently be unable to generate interpersonal trust.
A hypothesis this study plans to examine. Levi proposes that public institutions can
secure confidence by placing themselves in institutional arrangements that make so
that their incentives weigh on them act in ways that benefit individuals in their
jurisdiction above their idiosyncratic interests. In other words, public institutions can
secure confidence by creating bureaucratic arrangements that reward competence
and honesty in its agents (Levi & Sherman, 1997). Therefore a major source of
distrust and consequently low confidence in public institutions according to Levi
(1998) are promise breaking, incompetence and antagonism of agents toward the
citizenry whom they require trust.

Tying her discussion in, Levi posits that citizenry consider trustworthy public
institutions as those whose procedures for executing duties concur with existing
standards of fairness and is capable of credible commitments. Citizenry in her
opinion are most likely to go along with policies they do not prefer so long as such
policies are judged to be engendered legitimately. Levi’s arguments are given much
weight by evidence she cites from Tyler (1990) and experimental evidence from
Fronlich and Oppenheimer (1992) that if processes are believed to be fair and just
even unfavorable outcomes are more likely to be accepted.

Tyler (2001) in discussing the antecedents of dissatisfaction and low confidence
in public institutions of the United States make some observations that are useful to
15

the present study. He maintains that from his research people’s evaluations of the
legitimacy of public institutions are tied to judgments of fairness of procedures used
by these institutions in carrying out their duties. Tyler conducted a study on the
personal experiences of 652 citizens in Chicago, who had had recent dealings with
the police and courts (Tyler, 1990). He explored whether perceptions of procedural
justice influence evaluations of such procedures legitimacy. As usual, findings
indicated the more confidence is placed in institutions when they carry out their
duties dispassionately.

Another question of relevance to the present study, as far as confidence in
public institutions is concerned, is what elements of procedures lead to judgments of
fairness? Tyler (2001) answers this question based on his work on people’s dealing
with legal governmental authorities that is the police and courts. He indicated five
judgments that influence views about fairness of these institutions. They are as
follows:

1. Favourabilty of the outcome (loss/gain)
2. The degree to which people are given the opportunity to voice out their
grievances.
3. People’s trust in the motives of authorities.
4. The degree to which people feel they are treated with respect
5. Assessments of neutrality of governmental institutions they deal with.

In Tyler’s assessment he found that ranking at the top of dimensions that
influence judgments of fairness are; trust in the motive of authorities, the degree to
16

which people feel they were treated with respect and neutrality of the institutions.
This he refers to as relational issues. What is noteworthy about his findings is that
issues regarding loss or gain were nearly insignificant as far as judgments of fairness
are concerned.

As Van Ryzin (2011) notes, confidence in civil servants is important because
“the bureaucracy is the largest arm of modern government and the one that most
regularly interacts with citizens in their ordinary lives”. Public institutions are vital
because, as Van Ryzin posits, governance forms a very basic fibre of society, which
interacts with almost everyone.

Van Ryzin in his empirical article (that investigated the relative influence of
process contrasted outcomes on the perceived trustworthiness of civil servants)
makes some notes applicable to the present study. Van Ryzin is of the view that
current literature errs in assuming that the general public view institutions of civil
service as more trustworthy depending on how much results they produce. Rather he
argues that “trust in people and institutions of authority often depends more on
process (such as fairness and equity) than on outcomes (achievements)”.

To verify

this assertion he run an empirical study to test the whether processes or outcomes had
an upper hand in influencing trust of civil service across 33 nations.

According to Van Ryzin, defining process can become obscure because it
sometimes ends up being confused with unnecessary bureaucracy. He further
maintains that some situations at first glance look like “bureaucratic red tape turn
outs”, but further analysis reveals them to be rational and fair. Van Ryzin goes on to
17

list fairness, equity, respect and honesty as the beneficial aspects of process. Tyler
(2001) remarked that citizens in their judgment of trust and confidence in public
institutions (trustworthiness) are much more concerned with neutrality, honesty and
lack of bias rather than productivity though its important.

The World Value Survey (WVS) provides some items that directly measure
confidence in governmental institutions.

The survey question is as follows:

I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me
how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of
confidence, not very much confidence or none at all?

It then goes on to name a number of organizations, out of which the present
study selects, the civil service, the police, the courts, the government and the
parliament to represent public institutions. Preliminary analysis on Wave 5 (selecting
Ghana and Hong Kong only) of the survey produced a Cronbach alpha of 0.72 when
the selected items were summed to represent overall confidence in public institutions.
The author proposes an alternative mechanism of measuring confidence in
governmental institutions by using the organizations named on the WVS and a
measure to assess perception of citizens’ judgment of processes employed by
institutions. Reasoning being that if process is a better a predictor of confidence in
governmental institutions, scores from perception of such judgments will predict the
level of confidence in such institutions. Following findings from Hibbing and
Theiss-Morse (2002), Van Ryzin postulates that a possible reason why process is a
better predictor of confidence and trust in public institutions is that, citizens may not
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necessarily have the skills to judge government outcomes as lucidly as they can
bureaucratic process, which may be experienced more realistically and attributed to
the actions of governmental institutions.

Newton and Norris (2000) note that since institutions are mostly broadly based,
the public’s judgment of them is less likely to be affected by certain news items or
lone events. In light of such stability, whatever level of confidence people place in
governmental institutions may be a true indicator of their perceptions of such
institutions and the modern world. Durkheim (1997) reiterates how embedded
governmental institutions are in the lives of its nationals when he avers that the state
is too remote from individuals. He notes that a society can only be maintained if
there are secondary groups near enough to individuals to draw them into the general
torrent of social life. Public institutions, as proposed by the present study, form such
secondary groups.

2.3. Defining trust: thoughts from McKnight and Chervany
In an attempt to aid researchers better explore and examine empirical results
from trust literature, McKnight and Chervany (2001) have elucidated conceptual and
measurable ideas that provide a multidisciplinary picture of the essence of trust
definitions. They further provide an analysis of distrust (mistrust) arguing that trust
and distrust are separate constructs that may function together to ensure optimal
functioning of an individual or society.

As discussed earlier, current trust definitions revolve around the notion that one
is willing to be vulnerable to others based on the assumption that they can be
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depended on. In their analysis, McKnight and Chervany make an important
clarification, they caution researchers that saying one intends to depend on another’s
benevolence is lumping one’s perception of an attitude with intention. They assert
that a more adept thematic understanding of the concept must rather argue that we
intend to depend on another person because we believe they are benevolent.
Benevolence then becomes an antecedent to trust. This clarification becomes useful,
as the present research looks at how cultural context may influence trust, not just the
action but also perceptions that encourage or inhibit it. That is, how the cultural
context creates perceptions that may direct behaviour and attitudes in certain ways.
While McKnight and Chervany’s argument is succinct in capturing the crux of what
trust means, they still overlook other factors that may influence how trust is ventured
based on the context of the actors. Perception of benevolence remains crucial in
facilitating the action of trust however; consider a scenario where individuals wish to
ingratiate themselves to another for future reciprocity or have no trust-related
information to go on. Taking the others benevolence into account will be important
but even more vital will be the trustor’s initiative to take a risk in the absence of any
evidence to speak to the trustee’s benevolence. This is when contexts become
relevant in guiding the action of trust. Contextual variables may shape other
perceptions that pertain to trust besides benevolence.

Returning to McKnight and Chervany’s examination of the meaning of trust by
breaking the construct down into intention and behaviour, I discuss their propositions
in relation to the current research. First, looking at trust as an intention, they define
trust as a willingness to depend on another with some degree of security despite the
possibility of negative consequences and inability to exercise control over the other
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person’s behaviour. This definition speaks to the trustor willingly accepting the risks
that the trustee may expose them to; hence an assumption of freedom to act is present
in trust relations. In other words, the ultimate decision to invest trust is under the full
control of the trustor. But do contextual artefacts nudge this control? What would
happen in when circumstances are systematically varied? The present study probes
these important ideas by examining situation effects on trust behaviour.

In McKnight and Chervany’s conceptualization, drawing from Mayer, Davis
and Schoorman (1995), trusting viewed through the lens of intention splits into
Willingness to Depend that is, the volition to make one’s self vulnerable to another
absent full security. Second, is Subjective Probability of depending which Curall and
Judge (1995) define as the degree to which one forecasts that they can depend on
another person with relative feelings of security.

Second, McKnight and Chervany explore the meaning of trust-related behaviour.
This they explain as a person voluntarily depending on another with relative security,
in spite of the possibility of negative consequences. Trust behaviour therefore moves
a step further, consequently, beyond thoughts to actions that give trustee some sway
over the trustor once trust behaviour is set in motion.

Analyzing distrust, McKnight and Chervany cite Deutsch’s (1977) definition of
the concept which is “avoiding an ambiguous path that has greater possible negative
consequences than positive consequences”. In their opinion Deutsch’s (1958) usage
of the word suspicion for distrust confirms their belief that he was of the view that
the two constructs are opposites. They go on to examine the Webster and Random
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House dictionary for definitions of distrust, suspicion, suspect and doubt. The
conclusion arrived at was that these the terms here differ not in kind but degree.
While this discovery throws much needed light on the fuzziness of distinguishing
trust from distrust, an analysis of dictionary definitions may provide a pathway for
theorizing but should not be a main means of postulating such theories. Another
observation McKnight and Chervany make is that, trust and distrust may reside
mutually in the same individual at the same time, for example one may trust their
friends but distrust enemies. This forms an optimal coping strategy because in
ambiguous situations individuals willingly rely on others but put safeguards in place
or backups in case of unforeseen events. This conception most accurately captures
real life.

Tying the discussion in, it is worthy to note that, two schools of thought prevail
as far as conceptualizing distrust and trust. One school holds that trust and distrust
are two ends of a spectrum while the other is of the view that they are separate
concepts that act as opposites. McKnight and Chervany point out that current
conceptions of the constructs favor the latter theorizing because distrust has been
shown (Lewicki, McAallister & Bies, 1998) not to be a low end of trust but rather
trust can co-exist with distrust. Yamagishi and Yamagishi’s (1994) emancipation
theory of trust best captures the coexistence of trust and distrust. They move that
trust and commitment formation are coping strategies or alternative solutions to the
problem of social uncertainty. The logic behind this reasoning is that social
uncertainty cannot be avoided when we interact with others because while we seek to
improve our lots, we inadvertently expose ourselves to the risk of being exploited. In
their study Yamagishi and Yamagishi (1994) found that high trustors expressed that
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caution is needed when dealing with others. Even though the interpretation given to
this finding was that being prudent does not imply distrust, it still goes to show that
the willingness to be vulnerable to another party and the need to express caution can
coherently reside in an individual. Previous research from Geller (1966) cited by
Yamagishi and Yamagishi also showed that, high trustors ventured only trust when
there was no need to be cautious. When the need arose to be cautious the level of
trust they ventured was no different from low trustors.

Underlying Theories of Trust
Trust as social exchange.
According to Homans (1961) Social exchange is a give-and-take process, which
is, tangible or intangible, rewarding or costly and occurs between at least two people.
Fulmer and Gefland (2012) assert, based on previous studies, that these perspectives
shed light on how individuals come to trust others or entities. They further explain
that trust building is a subjective cost-benefit analysis for most people. If it is
perceived that the exchange is imbalanced to the ones disadvantage trust is curtailed
or ceases all together. This view supposes trust is a rational venture. Salanick and
Pfeffer (1978) maintain that individuals form beliefs and attitudes, and in this case
trust, through a balancing act of processing information gleaned from the social
environment.

Trust through attribution.
Attribution theory is defined by Kelly (1973) as the theory of how people
explain others’ behaviour. According to Fulmer and Gefland (2012), the attribution
theory aids explain how trustors perceive the trustworthiness of the trustee. For
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example if the trustee’s actions are perceived to be well intentioned or generous, then
trust will be vested.

Social identity and trust.
Finally Social identity theory is examined; (Tafjel & Turner, 1979) which is
also essential as far as this study is concerned because the present draws samples
from Ghana and Hong Kong. Both of which have been identified as collectivistic.
Social identity to a large extent plays an important role in social interaction and
provides basis for equivalence. According to Fulmer and Gefland (2012), individuals
strive to maintain a positive view of themselves, and when trustees are seen to be
connected to oneself, such as sharing similarities or group membership trust building
at the interpersonal level is enhanced.

2.4. Trust, Trust propensity and Trustworthiness: linkages and distinctions.
In a meta-analytic study, Colquitt, Scott and Lepine (2007) highlight the
distinction between trust, trustworthiness and trust propensity. Trustworthiness refers
to the ability, benevolence and integrity of the recipient of trust. These characteristics,
embodying trustworthiness, are regularly assessed in experimental designs by
reciprocity, generosity or promise credibility of the recipient of trust. Yamagishi et al.
(1999) provide experimental evidence that support the vital nature of trustworthiness
in cases where trust is vested. In their discussion they argue that when individuals
have decided not to invest trust (low trustors) they are generally very cautious to
avoid being duped. Individuals who have decided to invest trust (high trustors,) on
the other hand, in a bid to explore new but risky opportunities are sensitive to
information pointing to the trustee’s trustworthiness. King-Casas, Tomlin, Anen,
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Camerer, Quartz and Montague (2005) also found in a multi-round version of the
trust game that reciprocity by one participant significantly predicted future trust
behaviour of the other participant. They further observed this finding in neural
responses in the dorsal striatum. This finding further emphasizes the importance of
trustworthiness in behavioural trust dynamics.

Colquitt et al. (2007) define trust propensity as the dispositional willingness to
rely on others. Trust refers to the intention to accept vulnerability to the trustee on
the basis of a positive expectation of their prospective actions. Colquitt and
colleagues note that while trust has been widely explored there still no consensus as
far as discriminating what the construct encompasses. They identify five main
popular definitions/descriptions of the term:

1. Behavioural intention (e.g., Mayer et al. 1995; McKnight, Cummings, &
Chervany, 1998; Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt & Camerer 1998);
2. Personal characteristic that inspires positive expectations of others;
trustworthiness (e.g., Butler & Cantrell, 1984; McKnight et al., 1998);
3. Internal action synonymous to either choosing or judging (e.g., Lewis &
Weigert, 1985; Riker, 1971);
4. Personality trait that gains root from childhood and remain stable through
adulthood (e.g., Rotter, 1967; Webb & Worchel, 1986); and
5. A form of risk-taking (Kee & Knox, 1970; Lewis & Weigert, 1985; Zand,
1972).
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While these schools of thought address the concept of trust from different
angles, what is consistent in current literature is that trust (action), trustworthiness
and trust propensity are linked but still distinct concepts. This link between these
concepts is manifested in interactions between the trustor and the target of trust.
Colquitt et al. (2007) found that trust propensity is positively correlated to
perceptions of others’ trustworthiness.

The finding that trustworthiness positively relates to trust has not always
received support. Kiyonari, Yamagishi, Cook and Cheshire (2006) found in an
experimental study using the classic one-shot trust game that the fact that an actor
knows that trust has been invested in them would not necessarily lead them to act in
a trustworthy manner. They however note that the one-shot trust game is limited in
exploring trust-trustworthiness relationships, as the one-shot trust game relieves the
trustee of the moral obligation of reciprocating. Yakovleva, Riley and Werko (2010),
on the other hand, discovered that a person’s propensity to trust would influence both
his/her and his/her partner’s trust. They explained that trust is reciprocated because
the trustworthy person is conscious of being trusted and this awareness leads them to
behave accordingly. Put alternatively if one thinks that they are trusted they will act
in a trustworthy manner. This spurs a cycle of trusting behaviour in both partners as
has been noted by Yakovleva et al. (2010). Therefore the effect of propensity to trust
would be indirect once perceptions of trustworthiness have been formed.
The present study seeks to drive the exploration even further by probing
possibilities that may ensue under systematically controlled conditions where the
trustworthiness is manipulated both positively and negatively. Also, exploring the
seemingly contradictory findings of Kiyonari et al. (2006) and Yakovleva et al.
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(2010), the present work examines the trustor’s trust behaviour. Trustworthiness, on
the part of the trustee, has been implicated as determining whether trust will be
displayed (by the trustor) or not.

2.5. The importance of trust referents
Muethel and Bond (2013) maintain that in cross-cultural research trust
examined without specifying referents runs the risk of producing misleading results.
Providing a backdrop to this claim, Muethel and Bond refer to the myriad of
contradictory results that researchers have found in their empirical work on trust in
collectivistic cultures. Some scholars have shown members of collectivistic cultures
to be high on trust while others have shown collectivistic cultures to be low on trust.
Luo (2005) is of the view that this contradiction can be clarified if a distinction is
made between in-group trust (trust in known persons) and out-group (trust in
unknown persons). Barber (1983) asserts that in-group trust is founded on
relationship ties while the application of moral rules to persons outside one’s
in-group results in out-group trust. Jing and Bond (2014) lend support to this in their
suggestion that a general form of trust is established by generalizing from one’s level
of in-group trust.
Huff and Kelly (2003) in a seven-nation study comparing individualist and
collectivist societies on organizational trust found that when trust propensity was
conceptually distinguished into in-group and out-group trust, collectivistic societies
showed high level of in-group trust and a low level of out-group trust. Individualistic
societies were shown in their study to be high on out-group trust. Muethel and Bond
(2013) have reiterated the stance by scholars that this conceptual distinction in trust
disposition is mostly relevant when examining collective societies since the
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distinction between in-group and out-group is more present in such societies. That
being said, Delhey, Newton and Welzel (2011) assert that as far as group dynamics
go, group members from all countries distinguish trusting members of the in-group
from trusting those of the out-group.

Freitag and Bauer (2013) have also investigated trust in relation to trust
referents. While Freitag and Bauer’s discussion was to examine the ongoing debate
regarding the cross-cultural dimensional and the measurement equivalence of social
trust, which is still relevant to the present study, their findings relate to trust referents
in a distinct way. They theorized that trust can be distinguished into three forms;
namely particularized, generalized and identity-based trust. Their theory is based on
asking if trust is a coherent syndrome of social acting or if trust is referent specific.
According to Freitag and Bauer, trust as a coherent syndrome of social acting elicits
equivalent levels of trust regardless of referent. Trust depending on targets elicits
referent-specific trust.

Providing insight into their proposed distinctions, particularized trust is defined
as trust at close social range and is directed at known persons. This definition comes
very close to in-group trust as discussed by Muethel and Bond (2013). Generalized
trust as explained by Freitag and Bauer (2013) refers to trust directed more abstractly
and aimed at people in general, strangers included. This definition also comes close
to established definitions of out-group trust. Identity-based trust is directed as target
based on perceived affiliation with a known group. This kind of trust is directed at
targets without personal interaction and knowledge. Therefore experience with the
group of interest plays a greater role than disposition. Identity-based trust is not
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explicitly investigated in the current analysis but the concept is worth mentioning as
it could have an effect on both in-group and out-group trust mentioned earlier. Actors
classified as in-group or out-group may still be tagged with an identity. This may
cause a spillover of identity-based trust into in-group and out-group trust. Take a
close friend for example who is of foreign nationality, where do they fall? In my
view subjective judgments and situational circumstances of the trustee will
ultimately be relied on as to what kind of trust is to be directed at such a person.
However the dilemma of categorizing cannot be overlooked.

2.6. Situational determinants of Trust
While disposition remains influential in trust, research in social psychology has
indicated situational determinants are also important. Goto (1996) has contributed to
trust literature by examining the situational and dispositional determinants of trust.
Goto discovered, in her study, that dispositional trust is capable of predicting specific
trust behaviour and also the interaction of situational factors on such behaviour. She
maintained that trust is essential to daily functioning as it provides a mental heuristic
that enables individuals to rely on others. Goto’s study provides good insight into
antecedents of trust by focusing on the dispositional and situational determinants.
Nevertheless such situational determinants are highly influenced by the context
factors therefore it is essential to investigate these elements and how they pair with
disposition.

As far as measuring of the construct (trust) goes, Goto accepts the Rotter’s
(1967) Interpersonal Trust Scale (ITS) as critically important in measuring trust.
However, she notes that the ITS focuses solely on dispositional trust and neglects the
29

situational role of the specific target (trustee) in trusting behaviours. It is further
noted in Goto’s study that the ITS maintains a fairly constant social distance on
targets (classes of significant others) in its 25 item questionnaire. She maintains that,
the kind of target person, history of past transactions, may influence likelihood of
engagement in trust behaviour hence the need to incorporate such factors into
measurement. Zhang (1990) addressed this by developing the Interpersonal Trusting
Behaviour Scale (ITBS). The ITBS measures an individual’s trust toward 20
different target persons with respect to 18 different situations. This was to cater for
the situational difference that may influence trust behaviour. The target persons in
Zhang’s study clustered around intimates, acquaintances and strangers.

Goto sought to effectively address the issue of clearly determining how
situational and dispositional factors act and interact on trust behaviour. To achieve
this, she used a measure of trust devoid of much context unlike the ITS to obtain a
more general measure of dispositional trust and while varying types of target persons
(intimate, acquaintance, stranger) with low or high uncertainty. The resulting model
had participants indicate on a 7-point trustworthy/untrustworthy scale how
trustworthy specific targets were. Vignettes were designed to accomplish this and an
example is shown below.

“During a vacation, a (FELLOW TRAVELLER, OLD HIGH SCHOOL
CLASSMATE, BOY/GIRL FRIEND) introduces you to an exotic food of Central
America. He reassures you that the food is the most wonderful taste in the world. He
warns you that there is one chance in a (THOUSAND, MILLION) that the food
maybe contaminated and this would make you seriously ill.
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Goto makes a good attempt at separating the various antecedents of trust
behaviour but this measure falls short of fully measuring trust behaviour. A more
active measure of trust behaviour that requires participants to engage in some kind of
observable action is more suitable rather than select an item on a survey. Goto also
found that level of dispositional trust did not determine how situational uncertainty
and social distance influenced trust.

Investigating the effects of personality and situational variables on behavioural
trust, Schlenker, Helm and Tedeschi (1973) employed certain experimental
maneuvers and obtained findings that are pertinent to the current research. They used
Rotter’s (1967) interpersonal trust scale as a personality measure of general trust
level. This was done prior to conducting the study which enabled them to
purposefully select participants that scored near the upper end (high trustors) and
lower end (low trustors) on the interpersonal trust scale. Participants engaged in the
Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game with simulated opponents (participants were made to
believe these were actual people they were dealing with) so that complete control
over simulated player behaviour was possible. The PD game used here was a points
exchanging game where cooperation was more beneficial to players than competition,
such that if both players cooperated they each won 4 points, if they competed they
each lost 4 points, and if one cooperated and the other competed the cooperator lost 5
points and the competitor gained 5 points. Participants were given the opportunity to
exchange messages with the simulated player. These messages bordered on
simulated players revealing their intentions regarding the choices they were going to
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make prior to making them. The researchers varied the situation of the participant by
making the simulated player credible or dishonest..

Findings from Schlenker et al. (1973) indicated that, high trustors relied more
on the communication of the simulated player as they cooperated more after
receiving a promise from the simulated player than did low trustors. Participants
were also more cooperative after receiving highly credible promises. The situational
variation of promise credibility however was stronger in determining cooperation,
which is behavioural trust, than did personality score on trust. It should be noted
however that the interaction effect of personality score on trust and credibility was
not significant.

Payne and Clark (2003) carried out empirical work to explore dispositional and
situational determinants of trust in employees’ immediate line manager and mangers
in the industry. They hypothesized that dispositional factors will have more of an
impact on trust in managers in the industry while situational determinants would be
more influential as far as trust in immediate line managers. Payne and Clark reasoned
out these hypotheses based on the following logic. Whitner, Brodt, Korsgaard and
Werner (1998) maintain that trusting a generalized entity will be influenced to a
greater degree by personality and predisposition than trusting a specific entity with
whom one may have had contact. In the latter case Whitner et al. (1998) move that
direct experience might override basic predisposition to trust. The situational factors
implicated by Payne and Clark include role-set satisfaction and supportive
environment. While these situational variables are unlike what the present study
seeks to investigate, Payne and Clark’s work provide a comparable base for the
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present study. This is because as the present study seeks to explore how situational
variations and context factors influence trust in strangers which is somewhat
comparable to trusting an unknown industry manager.

After running a hierarchical regression entering trait anxiety and dispositional
trust in the first and second block respectively followed by situational variants in the
third, it was found that disposition had a stronger effect for trust in immediate line
managers and it remained so even after the inclusion of situational determinants. The
prediction that situational determinants will strongly predict trust in immediate line
managers was not supported. Results also indicated that a combination of disposition
and situational determinants predicted trust in both types of managers. These
findings seem within reason and the next step exploring trust is to explore such
situation effects on trust in strangers. Fishbein and Azjen (1975) propose attitudes
comprise three dimensions, the cognitive – information one has about an entity,
which influences their affect about the entity and consequently how they behave. It
therefore follows that in an unknown person, with whom an individual makes initial
contact- a distinction Payne and Clark (2003) do not make, it would be more likely
that situational determinants will influence cognitive judgments that trickle down to
affect and ultimately behaviour. Finally Payne and Clark completed their
investigation only with self-report measures, whereas the present study explores
self-report and behavioural measures.

2.7. Measuring Trust: Behaviour and Propensity
Issues regarding lucid measurement of constructs in the behavioural sciences
remain essential in any discussion. This debate remains because of the subjective
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nature and multiple definitions some constructs bear across different studies. As
stated earlier, Fulmer and Gefland (2012) suggest an arbitrary solution by calling on
researchers to operationally define constructs of interest clearly in order not to
confuse consumers of research. Crossing the hurdle of definition begs the question;
how do we measure such definition? One of the concerns of Kramer (1999) was to
move measurement of trust beyond the cognitive level to behavioural. Most studies
measure trust by having respondents complete a questionnaire. Such assessments
have been vital in trust literature but as Kramer (1999) noted, there is the vital need
for measurement of a complex construct as trust beyond passive assessments, to
more active assessments that involve participants engaging in consequential
behaviour. Fehr, Fischbacher, Rosenbaldt, Schupp and Wagner (2003) and Naef and
Schupp (2009) have made strides to that effect in their respective studies.

Fehr et al. (2003) examined trust and trustworthiness by integrating behavioural
experiments into representative surveys. This was done in an attempt to overcome
the weaknesses that both approaches may present. Fehr et al. note such weaknesses
as follows

“Typically, laboratory experiments suffer from homogeneous subject pools and
self-selection biases. The usefulness of survey data is limited by measurement error
and by the questionability of their behavioural relevance”.

The current review discusses their methodology and how it may be improved.
Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman and Soutter (2000) blazed the trail (for Fehr et al.,
2003) engendering this kind of methodology. Their study, from a sample of students,
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indicated that attitudinal trust questions do not necessarily predict actual trust
behaviour in controlled experiments and also hints at the limitations of previous
experiments. What’s more? Fehr et al. (2003) highlight the fact that using
representative samples is vital in efforts to increase generalization. Attitudinal
questions in their opinion will be a better indicator of real life behaviour when
representative samples are employed. Furthermore Fehr et al. (2003) note that
Glaeser et al.’s study expose the major advantage in combining surveys with
experiments. The advantage is that such a combined study affords the opportunity for
the accuracy of behavioural contents of survey items to be confirmed. In other words
with relative ease survey responses can be contrasted with experimental responses.
Fehr et al. are of the view that this combined method is not widely used because of
the ‘separation’ of research communities with either survey or experimental
orientations in the social sciences.

The trust game designed as a social dilemma, between two players, by Berg,
Dickhaut and McCabe (1995), is normally used to measure trust behaviour in social
science experiments.

Fehr et al. describe it as follows:

“In this game player A and player B are matched. Both are endowed with 10
Euros. Player A can send any amount between 1 and 10 Euros to player B. The
experimenter doubles the amount sent, that is, if A sends x Euros, player B receives
2x Euros. After player B has been informed about the amount sent by A, B can send
any amount between 1 and 10 Euros, which is then also doubled by the experimenter.
Thus, if B sends y Euros to A player A receives 2y Euros. The total payoff for player
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A is thus given by 10 – x + 2y Euros; the total payoff for B is given by 10 + 2x – y
Euros”.

The logic behind using this game as a trust measure is presented by Fehr et al.
in the following manner. The game is a simple sequential trade under incomplete
contract enforcement. That is for Player A, the Euros owned by B are worth twice as
much as for B, and the opposite is true for A. In light of that both players will fare
better if they traded but player A has to be willing to trust B to trade and B will have
to be trustworthy. In simpler terms, the amount passed by the sender measures trust,
“a willingness to place faith in another (at personal cost) and the amount returned to
the sender by the trustee measures trustworthiness (Johnson & Mislin, 2011). Fehr et
al. first of all had to out-maneuver the administrative hurdle which implementing the
game in the context of a survey presents. Without their maneuver they had to
interview players A (first half of participants) and players B (second half of
participants). Players B would then be informed of their corresponding player A’s
decision after which B has to make a decision. Finally B’s decision is communicated
to the corresponding player A. This procedure would have been necessary to
maintain the sequential requirement of the game.

However, in their proposed

improved design, Fehr et al. postulate a method that conducts the sequential game in
a simultaneous fashion.

The design requires player B to make a decision for all the

possible transfers of player A.

Player B therefore makes their decision before

knowing the actual transfer of player A and vice versa. Players are then informed of
actual transfers after the Ex-Post decisions of both. The actual transfer of B is
determined by the amount sent by B in response to the actual transfer of A. The
method employed by Fehr et al. is not without advantages and disadvantages. They
36

note that the main advantage is that it gives insight into the possible behaviours of
player B than when they have to make a one-off decision. The main disadvantage is
that, responding to 11 possible situations is not as emotionally arousing as being
confronted with an actual decision. The proposed solution that is actually employed
in their study is reported verbatim as follows:

“Our method rests on the idea that the experimenters determine – based on
previous experimental knowledge about the distribution of first mover actions – an
ex-ante distribution of first mover actions. Every player B is confronted with a
randomly chosen first mover action from an ex-ante distribution and he only
responds to this randomly chosen action. For the decisions of players B and the final
payoffs it does not play a role that the first-mover action has been randomly chosen
from an ex-ante distribution. It is sufficient that every player B knows that he is
matched with a randomly chosen other (anonymous) participant of the survey who
has been assigned the role of player A. This method allows the administrators of the
survey to simultaneously conduct the experiments with players A and B in a one-step
procedure and to match players A and B ex-post, i.e., after all As and B’s have made
their decisions”.

The major advantage of this design, according to Fehr et al., is that it affords the
survey-experiments combination without distorting the traditional method of
conducting surveys.

Naef and Schupp (2009) also examined the intricacies of measuring trust. They
explored experiments and surveys in contrast and combination. As is relevant to the
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present study, I focus on the methodology and marginally on their findings. Naef and
Schupp employ the same method as Fehr et al. with the following variation: They
created and used a new trust scale, containing 3 statements, in response to criticism
of the widely used trust question in many surveys (Knack & Keefer, 1997; La Porta,
de Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1997; Zack & Knack, 2001). The question stated,
“Generally speaking will you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be
too careful in dealing with people?” The major criticism leveled against this measure
is that it is not correlated with trust behaviour.

Naef and Schupp used the same methodology as Fehr et al. (2003). The
significant variation was the change in survey item employed to measure trust.
Naef and Schupp’s study further reinforce the need to combine experiments and
survey’s to explore the correlations of trust behaviour as directed to different
referents as well as trust propensity. The present study seeks to investigate trust
behaviour and its correlation with the latter.

The trust game just like any other method in social science has come under
criticism. Cox (2004) is of the view that the amount sent in the trust game cannot
clearly be distinguished from altruism. Bohnet, Greig, Hermann and Zeckhauser
(2008) also note that the amount sent cannot pointedly mark trust from betrayal
aversion. However the trust game is still employed by most researchers as far as
measuring the behavioural aspects of trust. In their meta-analysis, Jonhson and
Mislin (2011) discovered 162 replications across 35 countries. Findings showed that
the amount sent during the trust game is influenced by random payment (i.e. only
certain participants will be randomly chosen for payment) after engaging in the game.
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Secondly using a simulated confederate may also influence amount sent during the
game. Furthermore trustworthiness is influenced by two things. First, the amount by
which the experimenter multiplies the amount sent and if participants play both the
roles of the sender and receiver.

Though the methodology used by Fehr et al. (2003) and Naef and Schupp (2009)
provide an excellent way to investigate trust, the current research seeks to explore
this deft methodology even further by systematically manipulating the trust referent
to be either generous or thrifty – counting that as situational manipulation. Current
technology affords the opportunity to do so by moving the trust game to a
computer-based system where hypothetical players are matched with participants.
Furthermore this study seeks to increase the turns each player has in the game
without explicitly informing participants of the number of turns they have. This will
aid the measurement of participants true trust behaviour at each stage of the game
providing valuable insight on how experience and perceived predictability influences
trust behaviour. It should however be noted that this measure, as far as the present
study is concerned will measure trust in strangers.
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CHAPTER 3 RESEARCH DESIGN AND HYPOTHESES
3.1. Research Design
The present study will combine an experimental and survey design to examine
trust in strangers. In the experimental setup participants will engage in a
computer-based trust game. A repeated measures ANOVA will be used to investigate
behavioural differences between samples on trust in strangers.
Experiment
Independent variables
The between-subjects factors will be assigned condition (i.e., dealing with a
generous or thrifty opponent) and culture (i.e., Ghanaian and Hong Kong sample).
The between subjects factors will serve as independent variables in the trust game.
Dependent variables
The within-subjects factor will be participants’ transfers of credited points
across transactions in a multiple-round trust game. The points participants transferred
will therefore serve as dependent variables.
Survey
On the other hand, the survey was designed to capture the respondents'
self-report trust and its psychological correlates.

3.2. Cultural differences in trust between Ghana and Hong Kong: Consequences
of cultural context
As discussed, current literature has shown persuasive evidence of the impact of
a society’s socioeconomic and political climates on trust among citizenry. These
evidences suggest that societies with favourable socioeconomic and political
climates promote contexts of trust. With regard to the socioeconomic climate,
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high-income equality and a general perception of a move toward equal human
development is beneficial to trust development. A political climate that insists on
effective functioning public institutions that uphold the rule of law and intolerance to
exploitation also encourage trust. The present study draws participants from the
Republic of Ghana in West Africa and the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region of the People's Republic of China. These cultural contexts vary considerably
on socioeconomic and political climates, with Hong Kong having a seemingly more
favourable socioeconomic and political climate compared to Ghana. Socioeconomic
indicators from The Human Development Report (United Nations Development
Program, 2009) rank Hong Kong’s human development at 15 with an index of 0.891
and a GDP per capita (Purchase Power Parity, PPP, in US dollars) of 52,383.45.
Ghana’s human development is ranked at 138 with an index of 0.573 and a GDP per
capita (Purchase Power Parity, PPP, in US dollars) of 3,532.33. These indicators
show the Hong Kong context to be socioeconomically more favourable compared to
the Ghanaian context. Political climate indicators also show a similar trend. Indices
extracted from The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) (The World Bank
Group, 2014) show that compared to Ghana, Hong Kong experiences a stricter rule
of law, more control over corruption and more quality public and civil services
independent from political pressures (See Appendix 3). Altogether these indices
show that compared to Ghana, Hong Kong presents a more favourable
socioeconomic and political climate. Therefore in the present work, Hong Kong
participants are expected to show a higher level of trust compared to Ghanaians.
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World Value Survey data.
Data obtained from representative samples in the fifth wave of the World Value
Survey (WVS 2005-2007) also prove consistent with the previously discussed
pattern. The data indicates that compared to Ghanaian respondents, Hong Kong
Chinese respondents reported a higher level of trust. This assessment is derived from
a WVS item, “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or
that you need to be careful when dealing with people?” The item in question has
been employed by a number of studies to investigate general trust. Regarding public
institutions, data from the fifth wave of the world value survey also show that
compared to Ghanaian respondents, Hong Kong Chinese respondents indicate a
greater confidence in public institutions such as the civil services, the government
and, parliament (legislative council in Hong Kong) (See Appendix 2).

Hypotheses.
Research questions presented in the Introduction are probed with the following
hypotheses. These hypotheses are tested in the present study based on the literature
and background presented.

1. What are the behavioural and self-report features of trust in strangers among
Ghanaians and Hong Kong Chinese? How are these features related to one another?

Since Hong Kong Chinese function in a more favourable socioeconomic and
political climate it is expected that, Hong Kong Chinese students will score higher
than Ghanaian students on behavioural (Hypothesis 1a) and self-report (Hypothesis
1b) trust in strangers. Current literature indicates that trustworthiness (e.g. Schlenker
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et al., 1973; Yamagishi et al., 1999; King-Casas et. al, 2005) has significant impact
on trust. In that regard, manipulating reciprocity by making an opponent (in the trust
game) generous (more trustworthy) or thrifty (less trustworthy) is expected to have a
significant influence on behavioural trust. Participants encountering a generous
opponent will therefore invest more trust compared to those encountering a thrifty
opponent in a trust game (Hypothesis 1c). Finally, as ones tendency is expected to
guide action, self-report and behavioural trust in strangers are expected to be
positively related (Hypothesis 1d). Hypothesis 1(a, b, c & d) examines the nature of
and relationships between self-report and behavioural trust in strangers.

As previously discussed fair and egalitarian public institutions are an important
influence on trust in strangers. In that regard, the influence of perceived nepotism in
public institutions will be explored as a potent explanation for expected cultural
differences in trust in strangers.

2. Do public institutions create an environment that influence trust in strangers?
How does perceived nepotism in public institutions provide this influence?

Since Hong Kong Chinese seem to be functioning in more favourable political
climate compared to Ghanaians it is expected that Ghanaian students will report a
higher perception of nepotism in public institutions than Hong Kong Chinese
students (Hypothesis 2a). Based on previously discussed evidence (e.g. Freitag &
Buhlmann, 2009; Freitag & Traunmuller, 2009) that point to the influence cultural
contexts on trust, perceived nepotism in public institutions is proposed to explain
cultural differences in behavioural (Hypothesis 2b) and self-report (Hypothesis 2c)
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trust in strangers. Hypothesis 2 therefore explores the influential role of public
institutions on trust in strangers
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CHAPTER 4 METHOD

4.1. Participant demographics
314 university students were recruited for the present study. The Hong Kong
sample consisted of 50 male and 140 female students from Lingnan University, with
age ranging from 17 to 25 years (M = 20.1, SD = 1.41). The Ghanaian sample
consisted of 57 male and 67 female students from University of Ghana, with age
ranging from 18 to 30 years (M = 21.99, SD = 2.32).

4.2. Measures
Behavioural trust
Computer-based trust game.
The trust game is designed to assess behavioural trust based on Naef and
Schupp’s (2009) simplified version as described below:

“The design of the simplified trust game is as follows. Two players are each
endowed with 10 euros. The first mover decides how many of his or her 10 euros he
or she would like to transfer to the second mover. The experimenters double each
transfer. The second mover then gets to know the first mover's transfer and then
decides him or herself about the back-transfer. As with the first mover, the second
mover can transfer any amount between zero and ten euros. The second mover's
transfer is doubled as well”.

The first mover’s transfer (Player A) provides a measure of trust behaviour since
they take the initial risk with the belief that the second mover (Player B) will
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reciprocate. Player B’s transfer provides a measure of trustworthy behaviour. After a
stipulated number of transfers, the game is over and participants are sometimes paid
what they earned. Payment is usually dependent on the type of study and resources
available to the experimenter.

I conceived the concept for an intelligent computer-based trust game, to
measure trust behaviour toward people met for the first time, after an examination of
Fehr et al. (2002). In their study Fehr et al. proposed an ex post facto version of the
trust game where every player B is confronted with a randomly chosen player A
from an ex-ante distribution. Player B is then to determine their actions based on
player A’s already provided responses. In the present study, participants are paired
with simulated players in a computer-based game designed to produce manipulated
actions of a “Player B” depending on the experimental condition. Manipulated
actions of Player B constituted systematically varying the characteristics of simulated
player to either be generous or thrifty.

Generous opponent condition: Simulated player with the following programmed
configuration for transfers at each stage.
Participant transfer + 2
Thrifty opponent condition: Simulated player with the following programmed
configuration for transfers at each stage.
Participants transfer – 2
If participant transfer < or = 2, simulated player transfers 0
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This afforded the administrative opportunity to merge a survey with an experiment.
The trust game and survey were both computer-based. All participants took on the
role of Player A because trust behaviour was of prime interest in the present study.

Manipulation checks of the trust game.
Manipulation checks were put in place to assess the efficacy of the
computer-based trust game. Participants were to rate how real and generous they
perceived their opponent to be. Both perceived reality and generosity of the opponent
was to be rated on ten-point scale. The scale ranged from 0-10. 0 indicating the
lowest perceived of reality and generosity and 10 indicating the highest level of
perceived reality and generosity.

Self-report trust
Since the official language of Ghana is English, and university students in the
country are required to be competent in its usage, all measures used, for the
Ghanaian sample, were in English. As the official languages of Hong Kong are
Chinese and English, a Chinese-English bilingual version of the survey was used for
the Hong Kong sample. Back translation was used to ensure equivalence between
English and Chinese versions of the instruments (Brislin, 1986).

Targeted trust.
This scale was modeled from five items on trust in the WVS (2005-2007) and
rated on a five-point Likert scale. Participants were asked to indicate the level of
trust they had in certain entities. These entities included family, people known
personally, people met for the first time, people of another nationality and people of
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another religion. Ratings ranged from 1 (do not trust at all) to 5 (trust completely).
Trust in people met for the first time was adopted as the measure of trust in strangers.

Self-report measures on public institutions
Perception of nepotism in public institutions.
This scale was modeled from an item (rated on a five-point Likert scale) used in
the International Social Survey Programme’s (ISSP 2006) role of governance survey.

Do you think that the treatment people get from public officials in [Respondents
Country] depends on whom they know?

The aforementioned question was asked of the police, courts, legislative council,
the government and the civil service, with public officials being replaced by these
various entities. Participants rated the extent to which they perceived public
institutions to be nepotistic. Ratings ranged from 1(definitely does) to 5(definitely
does not). Scores were reversed such that high scores will indicate high perception of
nepotism and low scores indicate low perception of nepotism. The aggregated ratings
of the five institutions constituted the scale. (α = .69 for Hong Kong Chinese and .78
for Ghanaians)

4.3. Procedure
Participants were recruited through email announcements and advertisement on
both university campuses. A total of 314 undergraduate students (Ghana = 124, Hong
Kong = 190) participated in the current study. The same experimental protocols were
employed in Ghana and Hong Kong.
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Upon arrival at the study site, participants were directed to sit at a computer and
log on. A URL that gave access to the study was then provided. After reading and
completing a consent form, they then accessed the trust game. The game was
designed to randomly assign participants to either engage a generous or thrifty
opponent. They were then presented instructions and a tutorial on the trust game
(training phase) before they proceeded to play the game. To reduce the chance of
revealing the actual purpose of the research, participants were told that they were
engaging in a points exchange game which explores student investment behaviour.
They were also told that they were playing the game with another participant who
was taking part in the study at the same time as they were. To induce feelings of
ownership of the points they earn in the game, participants were told that they may
receive a prize at the end of the study depending on the number of points they had
upon completion (Lount, 2010). See Appendix 5 for instructions and a screenshot of
the trust game.

With an initial 10 points to begin with, participants had three turns to transfer
their desired number of points to the simulated player who did same at every stage.
However, participants did not know they had three transfer opportunities. In order to
increase the impression that the simulated players were real, a 10-second delay was
put on the time it took simulated players to make their transfers. Following Naef and
Schupp (2009), all transferred points were doubled. After each transfer, participants
were able to view the number of points the simulated opponent returned to them,
what they received after it was doubled, the number of points they had in total, and
the number of points the simulated player had in total. The game automatically came
to an end after the third transfer, with a summary of all transfers that had taken place
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during the game. Unlike in Berg et al.’s (1995) classic trust game transfers (in the
present study) were increased to three for two reasons. First, seldom do real life
interactions have classic one-off interactions. Second, the effects of manipulating
trustworthiness (as manipulated via opponent generosity in the present study) may be
assessed in a multi-round trust game. Also current literature (e.g. King-Casas,
Tomlin, Anen, Camerer, Quartz and Montague, 2005) indicates trustworthiness is
most crucial in eliciting trust behaviour. Stipulated number of transfers has not been
shown to influence how trust behaviour is elicited. The choice of three therefore
presents a concise choice to assess trust behaviour.

After the trust game, another URL was provided to participants to access and
complete the survey. The survey was placed after the trust game to avoid participants
relating their experimental decisions to ideas involving trust (Bellemare & Kroger,
2003). Upon completion of the survey, participants were thanked for their
participation in the study. Participants in Hong Kong were compensated with 30
Hong Kong dollars. After all sessions were completed, participants were fully
debriefed on the purpose of the study and were informed that no additional prize will
be received.

Hong Kong participants were compensated for their participation because
current practice in Hong Kong is such that most research projects compensate
volunteers for their time. Conversely, research projects in Ghana do not typically
provide compensation for volunteers. In that regard and due to resource constraints,
compensation was not provided to Ghanaian volunteers. Furthermore, the provision
of compensation for Ghanaian research projects is likely to attract volunteers who
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fall within the lower economic status of the population and dissuade volunteers in the
upper economic status of the population.
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CHAPTER 5 RESULTS
5. The nature of and relationship between behavioural and self-report trust in
strangers.
The computer-based trust game modeled from Naef and Schupp’s (2009)
version of Berg et al.’s (1995) classic trust game assessed behavioural trust in
strangers. During the trust game participants were randomly assigned to interact with
either a generous or thrifty opponent.

Table 1 shows statistics of the random

assignment in both samples.

Table 1
Trust game conditions
Conditions
Thrifty opponent

Generous opponent

Total

Hong Kong

91

99

190

Ghana

62

62

124

Total

153

161

314

Manipulation checks
Perceived reality of the simulated player.
There was no significant difference in the opponent’s perceived reality between
the two samples regardless of condition (i.e. Thrifty opponent vs. Generous
opponent). Hong Kong: Thrifty opponent (M = 3.64, SE = 0.28), Generous opponent
(M = 3.48, SE = 0.24), t(188) = .422, p > .05. Ghana: Thrifty opponent (M = 1.81,
SE = 0.25), Generous opponent (M = 1.86, SE = .024), t(122) = -.558, p > .05. This
indicates that with regard to how real participants perceived their opponent to be no
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significant differences were found between the generous and thrifty opponent
conditions, in both samples.

Perceived generosity of opponent.
Regarding simulated player characteristics, a significant difference in perceived
opponent generosity between conditions was observed in both samples. As predicted,
participants in the generous opponent condition rated the simulated player as more
generous compared to participants in the thrifty opponent condition. Hong Kong:
Thrifty opponent condition (M = 2.97, SE = 0.31), Generous opponent condition (M
= 6.00, SE = .026), t(188) = -7.55, p < .05, d = -1.10. Ghana: Thrifty opponent
condition (M = 2.63, SE = 0.31), Generous opponent condition (M = 3.56, SE = .029)
t(122) = -2.19, p < .05, d = -.39. These results indicate that participants’ perceptions
were consistent with assigned conditions. In both samples, participants in the
generous conditions perceived their opponent to be more generous compared to those
in the thrifty conditions.

5.1. Cultural difference in trust behaviour
In order to explore the effect of conditions (dealing with a thrifty or generous
opponent) on trust behaviour toward strangers (transfers during the game), a repeated
measures ANOVA was conducted. Culture (i.e. Ghana and Hong Kong samples) and
Conditions (i.e., Thrifty opponent conditions vs. Generous opponent conditions)
were the between-subjects factors (independent variables) and participants’ transfers
(1-3) during the game were the within-subjects factor (dependent variable). Pillai’s
trace multivariate test showed that the Transfers x Condition x Culture interaction
was not significant: V = 0.005, F(2, 309) = 0.75, p > .05. However, Pillai’s trace
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multivariate tests indicated significant main effects for transfers: V = 0.09, F(2, 309)
= 15.22, p < .0001. This indicates that the three transfers participants made (in both
samples) in the trust game were significantly different from each other. Pairwise
comparisons using a Bonferonni adjustment indicated significant differences
between transfers 1, 2 and 3 (See Appendix 1). Transfers x Culture interaction was
also significant V = 0.02, F(2, 309) = 3.70, p < .05. This shows that transfers made
by the Ghanaian sample were significantly different from transfers made by the
Hong Kong sample. The Ghanaian sample transferred more points across all
transfers than the Hong Kong sample (See Table 2). Hypothesis 1a which predicted
that Hong Kong Chinese will score higher on behavioural trust than Ghanaians was
not supported. Finally, Transfers x Condition interaction was also significant V =
0.15, F(2, 309) = 27.66, p < .0001, indicating that interacting with a generous or
thrifty opponent significantly impacted transfers. Participants dealing with a
generous opponent transferred more points than those dealing with a thrifty opponent
(See Table 2). Hypothesis 1c, which stated that participants encountering a generous
opponent would invest more trust compared to those encountering thrifty opponent,
was supported.

Tests of between-subjects effects indicated a non-significant Culture x
Condition interaction F(1, 310) = .83, p > .05. The main effect of Culture yielded a
significant F ratio of F(1, 310) = 14.94, p < .0001, indicating that the mean score for
transfers in the Ghanaian sample was higher than that of the Hong Kong sample (See
Table 2). The main effect of condition also yielded an F ratio of F(1, 310) = 33.48, p
< .0001. This showed that participants in the generous opponent condition
transferred more points than those in the thrifty opponent condition.
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Descriptive statistics, including means and standard deviations of transfers for
both conditions in both samples are presented in Table 2. Profile plots of culture x
transfers interaction for both conditions are presented in Figure 1 and, Figure 2. Data
in Table 2 as well as Figures 1 and 2 show that regardless of whether the opponent
was generous or thrifty, participants in Ghana always transferred more points than
participants in Hong Kong.
Table 2
Means and Standard Deviations of number of points being transferred across
Conditions in the two samples

Hong Kong

Ghana

Thrifty opponent

Generous opponent

Condition

Condition

M

SD

M

SD

Transfer 1

3.48

1.84

3.53

2.09

Transfer 2

2.98

2.25

4.61

3.91

Transfer 3

2.41

1.93

6.45

6.27

Total

8.87

6.02

14.59

12.27

Transfer 1

4.23

2.34

4.26

2.44

Transfer 2

3.98

2.86

6.16

4.72

Transfer 3

4.13

4.15

9.79

10.32

Total

12.34

9.35

20.21

17.48
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Figure 1. Profile plot of Culture x Transfers for the thrifty opponent condition
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Figure 2. Profile plot of Culture x Transfers for the generous opponent condition

Country-specific results indicated significant transfer main effects and transfer x
condition interaction effects for both samples.

In the Hong Kong sample: Transfer

main effects: V = 0.04, F(2, 187) = 3.86, p < .05, ηp2 = .04, this shows that transfers
(1 - 3) were significantly different from each other.

Transfer x Condition

interaction was also significant: V = 0.17, F(2, 187) = 18.82, p < .001, ηp2 = .17,
indicating that participants in the generous opponent condition transferred more
points than those in the thrifty opponent condition. For the Ghanaian sample:
Transfer main effects: V = 0.13, F(2, 121) = 9.07, p < .001, ηp2 = .13, , this shows
that transfers (1 - 3) were significantly different from each other. Transfer x
Condition interaction was also significant: V = 0.14, F(2, 121) = 10.01, p < .001, ηp2
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= .14, indicating that participants in the generous opponent condition transferred
more points than those in the thrifty opponent condition.

Summary of behavioural trust in strangers.
Overall, results on the nature of behavioural trust in strangers suggest that the
Ghanaian sample expressed more behaviour trust than the Hong Kong sample.
Hypothesis 1a was therefore not supported. With regard to reciprocity or
trustworthiness of the stranger as manipulated by generosity, dealing with a generous
opponent elicited more trust than dealing with a thrifty opponent. Hypothesis 1c was
supported by the results.

5.2. Cultural difference in self-report trust
The nature of trust in strangers.
In order to explore how the samples under study conceptualize trust in strangers,
a principal axis factor analysis was conducted on the targeted trust scale. This was to
ascertain the nature of trust in strangers (as assessed with trust in people met for the
first time) in the respective samples.

Ghana
The Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin measure, KMO = .59 (Hutcheson & Sofroniou, 1999)
indicated that the sample size was satisfactory for the current analysis. An initial
eigenvalue led analysis pointed to two factors that accounted for 76.24% of the
variance. Factor loadings after rotation are a reported in Table 3. Trust in people met
for the first time clustered with trust in family and trust in people known personally
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on the first factor. Trust in people of another religion and, trust in people of another
nationality clustered on factor 2.

Table 3
Factor structure of targeted trust items in the Ghana sample

Trust in your family

Factor 1

Factor 2

Factor Variance = 40.35

Factor Variance = 35.89

.88

Trust in people you know .84
personally
Trust in people met for the .73
first time
Trust in people of another

.93

religion
Trust in people of another

.92

nationality

Hong Kong
The Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin measure, KMO = .61 (Hutcheson & Sofroniou, 1999)
indicated that the sample size was satisfactory for the current analysis. An initial
eigenvalue led analysis pointed to two factors that accounted for 63.30% of the
variance. Factor loadings after rotation are a reported in Table 4. Trust in people met
for the first time clustered with trust in people of another religion and, trust in people
of another nationality on the first factor. Trust in family and trust in people known
personally clustered on the second factor.
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Table 4
Factor structure of targeted trust items in the Hong Kong sample
Factor 1

Factor 2

Factor Variance = 36.58

Factor Variance = 26.72

Trust in people of another .79
religion
Trust in people of another .74
nationality
Trust in people met for the .72
first time
Trust in your family

.89

Trust in people you know .37

.72

personally

The pattern of results from the exploratory factor analysis suggests that the
samples under study conceive self-report trust in strangers differently from each
other. In the Ghanaian sample, self-report trust in strangers associated with trust in
family and people known personally. This suggests that when Ghanaians conceive
self-report trust in strangers, the notion is associated with familiar others. The Hong
Kong sample on the other hand associated self-report trust in strangers with trust in
people of another nationality and people of another religion. This suggests that when
Hong Kong Chinese conceive self-report trust in strangers, the notion is associated
with unfamiliar others.
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Comparison of self-report trust in strangers
In order to compare self-report trust in strangers between Ghanaian and Hong
Kong Chinese respondents an independent samples t-test was conducted. This test
was statistically significant t(312) = -6.26, p < .0001; d = -.33. These results indicate
that Hong Kong Chinese (M = 2.61, SD = .76) reported a higher level of self-report
trust in strangers than Ghanaians (M = 2.04, SD = .83). Hypothesis 1b; which stated
that Hong Kong Chinese would score higher on self-report trust in strangers than
Ghanaians was supported.

Summary of the results on self-report trust.
Overall, results from self-report trust suggest that in the present samples,
Ghanaians and Hong Kong Chinese conceive self-report trust in strangers differently.
Ghanaian seem to associate trust in strangers with familiar others while Hong Kong
Chinese associate trust in strangers with unfamiliar others. Also Hong Kong Chinese
scored higher on self-report trust in strangers compared to Ghanaians. Hypothesis 1b
was therefore supported.

5.5. The mediating role of perceived nepotism in public institutions in the
relationship between culture and trust in strangers.

Comparison of perceived nepotism in public institutions
An initial comparison of levels of perceived nepotism in public institutions
between Ghanaian and Hong Kong Chinese respondents an independent samples
t-test was conducted. This test was statistically significant t(312) = 5.45, p < .0001; d
= .62. These results indicate that Ghanaians (M = 17.91, SD = 3.35) expressed a
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higher level of perceived nepotism in public institutions than Hong Kong Chinese (M
= 15.91, SD = 3.09). Hypothesis 2a; which stated that Ghanaians would report a
higher perceived nepotism in public institutions was supported

Self-report trust in strangers
The mediating role of perceived nepotism in public institutions in the
relationship between culture and self-report trust in strangers was examined. This
was done to explain observed cultural differences in self-report trust in strangers.
Procedures proposed by Preacher and Hayes (2004, 2008) to test indirect effects
were used. This approach was adopted over the more commonly used Baron and
Kenny (1986) method as its more prone to low statistical power in small samples
(MacKinnon, Lockwood, Hoffman, West & Sheets, 2002). The Baron and Kenny
method requires the X-Y relation to be significant. The challenge that may arise here
is that, the coefficient may not be significant because of low statistical power even
though a significant effect exists in the population. Baron and Kenny’s approach is
less favourable in this case as it results in a Type II error (Preacher & Hayes 2004).
Also the Sobel test, which is usually used to test for significance of indirect effects,
requires estimates of the indirect effect to be normally distributed. This rarely occurs
in small samples. Preacher and Hayes’s (2004) bootstrapping procedure evades this
problem, as it makes no assumptions about sampling distributions of estimates of
effects. This bootstrapping strategy produces estimates of the direct effect of X on Y
after entering the mediator(s), the indirect effect of X on Y via the mediator as well
as the total effect of X on Y.
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The SPSS macro designed by Hayes (2014) was used to assess the proposed
mediation model. With the Hong Kong sample as the reference group Culture was
positively related to trust in strangers (b = .33, t (312) = 6.26, p < .0001). Culture was
negatively related to perception of nepotism in public institutions (b = -.30, t (312) =
-5.45, p < .0001). Perception of nepotism among public institutions was negatively
related to trust in strangers (b = -.13, t (312) = -2.32, p < .05). A bias corrected
bootstrap 95% confidence interval of the indirect effect was obtained with 5000
bootstrapped samples. Results of the mediation analysis confirmed the mediating
role of perception of nepotism in public institutions in the relation between culture
and trust in people met for the first time (b = .06, CI = .01 to .13). Furthermore
results showed that the direct effect of culture was reduced (b = .30, t (311) = 5.34, p
> .0001) when controlling for perception of nepotism in public institutions. Results
are displayed in Figure 4.

These results indicate that the observed difference between Ghanaian and Hong
Kong Chinese respondents in self-report trust in strangers is partially explained by
perceived nepotism in public institutions. Hypothesis 2c which proposed perceived
nepotism as a potent mediator in the relationship between culture and self-report trust
in strangers was therefore supported.
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.33**
Culture
(.30)**

-.30**

Perception of
nepotism in
public
institutions

Trust in
strangers

-.13*

*p < .05, **p < .0001
Figure 3. Indirect effect of culture on trust in strangers through perception of
nepotism in public institutions.

Behavioural trust in strangers
Hypothesis 1a which predicted that Hong Kong Chinese will show a more
behavioural trust compared to Ghanaians was not supported. Results from the
repeated measures ANOVA showed that Ghanaians rather expressed higher
behavioural trust compared to Hong Kong Chinese. Secondly, consistent with
prediction Ghanaians compared to Hong Kong Chinese reported a higher perception
of nepotism in their public institutions. Finally coherent as well as significant
relationships were not found between self-report and behavioural trust in strangers,
and perceived nepotism in public institutions. The pattern of these results ruled out
the possibility of perceived nepotism in public institutions meaningfully explaining
observed cultural differences in behavioural trust in strangers (Hypothesis 2b).
Hypothesis 2b was therefore not supported.
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The relationship between behavioural and self-report trust in strangers
and perceived nepotism in public institutions.
The relationships between behavioural and self-report trust in strangers as well
as relationships with perceived nepotism in public institutions are presented in Table
5.
Table 5
Correlation matrix of self-report and behavioural and measures
P_NP
P_NP

T_PP

T1

T2

T3

1

ITP

(-.496**)
-.262**
C_PB (-.555**)
-.391**
T_PP (-.247**)
1
-.041
T1
(-.007)
(-.009) 1
-.067
.016
T2
(-.097)
(-.003) (.581**) 1
-.078
.040
.580**
T3
(-.175)
(.054) (.435**) (.829**) 1
.248**
.591**
-.035
.029
Note. *p < .05, **p < .01. Coefficients in parenthesis are correlations for the Ghana
sample; coefficients without parenthesis are for the Hong Kong sample.
P_NP = Perception of nepotism in public institutions T_PP = Trust in people
met for the first time (strangers); T1 = Transfer1; T2 = Transfer2; and T3 =
Transfer3.

Results presented in the correlation matrix show no significant relationships
between self-report trust in strangers (T_PP) and behavioural trust in strangers (T1,
T2 & T3). This indicates that self-report trust in strangers had no significant
influence on behavioural trust in strangers. Hypothesis 1d, which stated that
64

self-report and behavioural trust in strangers would be positively related, was not
supported. Perceived nepotism in public institutions was significantly and negatively
related to self-report trust in strangers in Ghana. In the Hong Kong sample, perceived
nepotism in public institutions was negatively related to self-report trust in strangers
but the relationship was not significant. These results indicate that in both samples,
low levels of perceived nepotism in public institutions leads to high self-report trust
in strangers. It should be noted that this relationship was statistically significant in
the Ghanaian sample not the Hong Kong Chinese sample.
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CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION
6.1. Behavioural and self-report trust in strangers across cultures
The present study presented results on behavioural (computerized web-based
trust game) and self-report (survey) trust in strangers. Combining an experiment and
a survey afforded the opportunity to merge the advantages of experimental and
survey design.

Manipulation checks on computer-based trust game
Manipulation checks from the trust game indicated that participants from both
samples were not entirely convinced that they have dealt with an actual person.
Nonetheless, this perceived reality did not predict trust trust behaviour (Ghana: b
= .12, t(122) = 1.28, p > .05; Hong Kong: b = .11, t(188) = 1.50, p > .05). The Ghana
sample reported a lower belief compared to the Hong Kong sample, although
participant ratings of simulated player characteristics were consistent with the
conditions to which they were randomly assigned. The simulated player in the
generous opponent condition was rated more generous compared to the thrifty
opponent condition. Again participants in the Hong Kong sample gave a higher
rating of generosity, to the simulated player, compared to the Ghana sample.

Summary of main findings
Contrary to prediction, participants in the Ghanaian sample vested more
behavioural trust, regardless of condition, than participants in the Hong Kong sample.
Behavioural trust also showed that participants encountering a generous opponent,
vested more trust compared to participants encountering a thrifty opponent.
Self-report trust showed opposite results. Hong Kong participants reported a higher
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level of self-report trust compared to Ghanaians. As well, Hong Kong participants
reported a lower level of perceived nepotism in their public institutions compared to
Ghanaians.

Relationships between self-report and behavioural measures showed the
following results. The behavioural trust measures did not correlate meaningfully with
the self-report trust measure and perceived nepotism in public institutions.
Self-report trust in strangers was negatively related to perceived nepotism in public
institutions as expected. As hypothesized, perceived nepotism in public institutions
explained observed cultural differences in self-report trust in strangers. The present
data was unable to explain observed cultural differences in behavioural trust. This
was due to the inconsistent pattern of behavioural trust differences. Contrary to
prediction Ghanaian students expressed more behavioural trust compared to Hong
Kong students Also Ghanaian students reported a higher perceived nepotism in
public institutions compared to Ghanaians. Furthermore correlations revealed no
significant relationships between behavioural trust and perceived nepotism in public
institutions. This ruled out perceived nepotism as a coherent mediator of cultural
differences in behavioural trust in strangers.

6.1.1. The nature of and relationship between behavioural and self-report
trust in strangers
Experimental decisions of trust (transfers during the trust game) showed that
Ghanaian participants vested more behavioural trust, regardless of condition, than
participants in the Hong Kong sample. This finding was contrary to initial prediction
that Hong Kong Chinese participants will show more behavioural trust. Also,
67

participants encountering a generous opponent, in both samples, showed more trust
compared to those encountering a thrifty opponent. This supported the hypothesis
that reciprocity or trustworthiness as manipulated by generosity of the opponent will
have significant impact on trust behaviour in strangers.

Self-report trust in strangers as assessed by trust in people met for the first time
showed different conceptualization across samples. Results of the exploratory factor
analysis on the targeted trust items revealed notable differences between samples. In
the Ghanaian sample, trust in strangers is associated with trust in family and trust in
people known personally; in the Hong Kong sample, trust in strangers is associated
with trust in people of another nationality and trust in people of another religion.
These results suggest that, Ghanaians associate trust in strangers with familiar others.
Hong Kong Chinese, on the other hand associate, trust in strangers with unfamiliar
others. This finding may give an indication as to why the Ghanaian sample ended up
expressing more behavioural trust than Hong Kong Chinese. Associating trust in
strangers with familiar others may have induced Ghanaian participants to express
more behavioural trust while associating trust in strangers with unfamiliar others
may have induced Hong Kong participants to express less behavioural trust.
Comparing self-report trust in strangers between samples showed Hong Kong
Chinese to report a higher level of trust in strangers than Ghanaians. This finding
was consistent with initial prediction. Indicating that compared to Ghanaians Hong
Kong Chinese report a higher tendency to trust strangers.
Results from correlational analyses also indicated no significant relationships
between self-report and behavioural trust in strangers. Indicating that trust tendency
in strangers as assessed by self-report trust in strangers had no significant influence
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on behavioural trust in strangers. The proposed hypothesis that tendency will guide
action to result in self-report and behavioural trust being positively related was not
supported. Indicating that, in the present samples, the tendency to trust strangers did
not associate or have any significant influence on actual behavioural trust in
strangers. Different influences driving self-report trust and behavioural trust in may
have produced this pattern. It is possible that the design of the trust game strips away
all other contextual effects (e.g. nepotism in public institutions) besides the
characteristics of the opponent being interacted with. Self-reporting by survey design
on the other hand is able to retain contextual effects.

6.1.2. Perceived nepotism and confidence in public institutions
Significant differences between the Ghanaian and Hong Kong Chinese samples
were found in perceived nepotism and confidence in public institutions. Results
showed that Ghanaians reported a higher level of perceived nepotism in their public
institutions compared to Hong Kong Chinese. This finding supported the initially
proposed hypothesis. Furthermore, Ghanaians reported a lower level of confidence in
their public institutions than their Hong Kong Chinese counterparts. Generally these
results show that compared to Ghanaians, Hong Kong Chinese regard their public
institutions to be fair and egalitarian in their dealings. In both samples perceived
nepotism was found to be negatively related to self-report trust in strangers.
Indicating that, low levels of perceived nepotism was associated with high levels of
self-report trust in strangers. This suggests that fair and egalitarian public institutions
foster trust in strangers. It should be noted that this relationship was statistically
significant in the Ghanaian sample alone. The nature of results regarding perceived
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nepotism in public institutions suggests that perceived nepotism in public institutions
has more of an effect on trust in strangers in the Ghanaian sample.

6.1.3. Explaining cultural differences in self-report and behavioural trust
Self-report trust in strangers
Mediational analysis was used to explain observed cultural differences in
self-report trust in strangers. The initial hypothesis proposed perceived nepotism in
public institutions to mediate the relationship between culture and trust in strangers.
This hypothesis received support as perceived nepotism in public institutions
partially mediated the relationship between culture and trust in strangers. This
suggests that, in the samples under study, differences in reported trust in strangers
are partially explained by how fair and egalitarian public institutions are perceived to
be. Therefore Hong Kong Chinese participants reported a higher self-report trust in
strangers compared to Ghanaians because Hong Kong Chinese regard their public
institutions to be more fair and egalitarian in their dealings. This perception of public
institutions as fair and egalitarian therefore encourages trust in strangers.

Behavioural trust in strangers
Results from behavioural trust in strangers presented some counterintuitive
results. It was proposed that Hong Kong Chinese will express more behavioural trust
compared to Ghanaians. This hypothesis was not supported as Ghanaians expressed a
higher level of behavioural trust compared to Hong Kong Chinese. Additionally,
Ghanaians reported a higher level of perceived nepotism in their public institutions
than Hong Kong Chinese reported in theirs as initially predicted. Indicating that
compared to Hong Kong Chinese, Ghanaians regard their public institutions to be
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less fair and egalitarian, it should intuitively follow (since current literature has
shown egalitarian public institutions have been shown to foster trust) that they would
express a lower level of behavioural trust in strangers compared to Hong Kong
Chinese who reported perceiving their public institutions as more egalitarian. This
was not the case as Ghanaians expressed more behavioural trust in strangers. These
results imply an inconsistent relationship between behavioural trust in strangers and
perceived nepotism in public institutions. Perceived nepotism in public institutions,
in the present study, is unable to coherently explain cultural differences in
behavioural trust in strangers.

Finally, no coherent and significant relationships were found between perceived
nepotism in public institutions and behavioural trust in strangers. These reasons ruled
out the possibility of perceived nepotism in public institutions coherently explaining
observed cultural differences in behavioural trust in strangers. The hypothesis that
proposed public institutions to mediate the relationship between culture and
behavioural trust in strangers was therefore not supported.

6.2. Trust in strangers and social capital: The role of public institutions
Findings from the present study support results from previous research that
point to the importance of public institutions when it comes to trust-building.
Self-report measures of trust in strangers supported the prediction that Hong Kong
Chinese will report a higher trust tendency in strangers than Ghanaians. Furthermore
perceived nepotism in public institutions successfully explained this observed
cultural difference in trust in strangers as proposed. Hong Kong Chinese reported
regarding their public institutions as more fair and egalitarian compared to
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Ghanaians who reported a higher perception of nepotism. This resulted on Hong
Kong Chinese reporting a higher trust in strangers. Another noteworthy finding was
that, exploring the conceptualization of trust in strangers in the present study
revealed that Ghanaians associate trust in strangers with familiar others while Hong
Kong Chinese associate trust in strangers with unfamiliar others. It would intuitively
follow that Ghanaians would report a higher level of trust in strangers. However,
Hong Kong Chinese still reported a higher level of trust in strangers. The pattern of
these results suggests that public institutions encourage trust in strangers when they
are perceived to be fair and egalitarian in their dealings. Importantly, the influence of
public institutions on trust in strangers in the present study was still potent in spite of
how trust in strangers is conceived.

The present study, unlike previous work that explored how public institutions
impact a general form of trust examined how public institutions impact specific form
of trust - trust in strangers. Consistent with research that has explored the relationship
between public institutions and general trust, this work shows that public institutions
do influence trust directed at strangers. As discussed earlier, trust is advantageous to
societal functioning as it eases beneficial actions such as resource pooling and
business venturing. Bellemare and Kroger (2003) argue the importance of trust in the
transactions cost paradigm. They maintain that high levels of societal trust and
trustworthiness reduce transaction costs. This increases efficiency of governments
and organisations and consequently improves economic performance. Data from the
World-Value Survey (WVS) suggests an increase in trust is associated with a higher
increase in economic growth (Knack & Keefer, 1997; Zak & Knack, 2001). The
same trust item on the WVS has been associated with judicial competence and
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reduced corruption (La Porta, de Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1997). The reasoning
behind trust reducing transaction cost is that it eliminates the need for excessive and
costly monitoring systems. Nevertheless it must be noted that before an environment
where costly monitoring systems are reduced can be cultivated, institutions with
oversight of ensuring reduced risk must prove they are up to the task in cases of
violations. Results from this study suggest that egalitarian public institutions are key
to encouraging trust in strangers. Therefore, in order to reap the benefits associated
with trust in strangers, public institutions have to promote norms of trustworthiness
and intolerance to exploitation.

Stolle (2002) has theoretically examined the importance of public institutions in
improving trust toward strangers. In her analysis she explores the debates that center
on public institutions and how they influence generalized trust. Citing Uslaner (2002),
Stolle avers that the level of inequality in the society is vital to generalized trust. This
is because citizens will find it easier to extend trust beyond familiar others to
strangers if they do not perceive public institutions to indulge in favouritsm.
Scandinavian countries, whose public institutions are known to ensure high levels of
income and gender equality, record the highest levels of trust. Rothstein and Stolle
(2002) also note that experiences of rampant corruption and discrimination by
political officials hamper not only institutional trust but trust in other citizens as well.
They implicate socialization as a means by which this cycle is perpetuated. Still
within the arena of general trust and public institutions, Freitag and Buhlmann
(2009), exploring contextual factors that promote trust, have found citizens are more
likely to place trust in one another when institutions with authority are universalistic,
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egalitarian, incorruptible, and punish non cooperative behaviour. They confirmed
this hypothesis using data from WVS (1995-1997 and 1999-2001).

Studies on the antecedents of generalized trust have provided important insights
on how general trust can be sustained in a bid to increase social capital such as
resource pooling. However, to better harness trust as a driver of social capital, there
is the need to move to a more target specific from of trust, which is trust in strangers.
Freitag and Buhlman (2009) note that incorruptible public institutions incentivize
individuals toward cooperation by creating an egalitarian environment that fosters
trust and quasi-acquaintances out of strangers. That being said, it would behoove
trust research that attempts to contribute to social capital research to focus on trust in
strangers instead of generalized trust.

6.2.1. Signaling theory: Public institutions and sustaining a trusting
environment
Signaling theory may help in elucidating how cultural artefacts (e.g. perceived
nepotism in public institutions) may explain differences in trust tendencies toward
strangers.

According

to

Dunham

(2011)

signaling

theory

explores

the

communication of information from one entity (the sender), to another entity (the
receiver). Connelly, Certo Ireland and Reutzel (2011) in describing the fundamental
processes underlying signaling theory posit that the sender must decide the process
through which to signal (communicate) said information. The receiver on the other
hand must choose how to interpret the received signal.
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Applying signal theory to the present work, I theorize that the cultural
environment within which an individual functions communicates signals that inform
individuals about the most adaptive way to navigate such an environment. It should
be noted however that the interpretation individuals’ give to received signals is as
important as the signal sent. This can be related to levels of perceived nepotism in
public institutions. Public institutions that are fair and dispassionate in dispensing
their duties send signals of a fair environment. These signals aid individuals’
perceive an environment with structures that ensure intolerance to exploitation. This
may have implications for trust tendencies since trust revolves around risk.
Especially when dealing with strangers. If actors believe to be functioning in a less
risky environment as a result of structures and monitoring systems put in place by
egalitarian public institutions then a more positive outlook will be projected on
trusting strangers as suggested by results in the present study. This is advantageous
because as argued trust vested in strangers carry added risks but provide the most
gains. If public institutions on the other hand send signals that indicate they condone
nepotism such signals will point to a lax environment without safeguards against
exploitation. Rothstein and Stolle (2003) make the following remark: if the officials
of the government or public administrations are not fair and trustworthy why should
the rest of society be? High rates of perceived nepotism in public institutions will
therefore have detrimental effects on trust tendencies and as the present work
suggests – trust tendencies toward strangers.

Connelly et al. (2011) discussing signaling theory in organizational psychology
posit that the phenomenon focuses on the deliberate communication of positive
information by an organization in order to portray a positive image to an outsider. In
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a culture on the contrary individuals aren’t just passive receivers of signals. We
engage in shaping signals as we function in the culture and re-send out these signals.
Grund and Sliwka (2007) posits that if a signal is interpreted in a certain way, an
individual who is unsure about how to interpret such a signal may imitate others in
their interpretation and decision-making. This may create a cycle that powers signals
containing information about culture.

6.3. Methodological Implications: The relationship between behavioural and
self-report trust.
Behavioural trust in strangers revealed counterintuitive results that did not
support initially proposed hypothesis. Contrary to prediction Ghanaians expressed
more behavioural trust compared to Hong Kong Chinese. Behavioural trust in
strangers was however consistent with manipulated conditions. Reciprocity or
trustworthiness as manipulated by generosity of the opponent showed that dealing
with a generous (more trustworthy) opponent elicited more trust behaviour than
dealing with a thrifty (less trustworthy) opponent. This finding supported the initially
proposed hypothesis. Perceived nepotism in public institutions was unable to explain
observed cultural differences in behavioural trust in strangers. This was due to the
pattern of findings regarding behavioural trust in strangers and perceived nepotism in
public institutions. As Ghanaians reported a higher level of perceived nepotism
compared to Hong Kong Chinese, it was expected that Ghanaians would show a
lower level of behavioural trust. This is because perceived nepotism has shown to
discourage trust not increase it. Furthermore significant and coherent relationships
were not found between the behavioural measure of trust in strangers and perceived
nepotism in public institutions. In fact behavioural measures of trust were not related
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to all self-report measure including self-report trust in strangers. This finding rejected
the proposed hypothesis that tendency will guide action resulting in a consequent
positive relationship between self-report and behavioural trust in strangers.
Nonetheless, perceived nepotism was able to explain observed cultural differences in
self-report trust in strangers.

These findings seem to suggest that in the present study, behavioural and
self-report trust have been influenced differently. Behavioural trust in strangers
varied as a result of manipulated generosity of the opponent. The generous opponent
(in both samples) elicited more behavioural trust compared to that elicited by the
thrifty opponent. Self-report trust in strangers on the other hand varied (across
culture) as a result of perceived nepotism in public institutions as low perception of
nepotism resulted in higher self-report trust in strangers.

This pattern of results where behavioural and self-report measures of trust
poorly correlate is consistent with current literature. Similar to the research design
of the present study, Glaeser et al. (2000) had participants complete a survey and
participate in a trust game. Their findings did not yield a strong relationship between
trust measures on the survey and behaviour exhibited in the trust game. The general
trust question used – do you think most people can be trusted – was not significantly
related to the amount of money sent during the trust game (-0.01, p > .05). Lazzarini,
Madalozzo, Artes and de Oliveira Siqueira (2005) sought to replicate Glaeser et al.’s
study in Brazil. Lazzarini et al. added a novel condition to that employed by Glaeser
et al. Their study consequently had two conditions where participants met face to
face with opponents or not. They also found that regardless of condition, self-report
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measures of trust did not significantly predict trust behaviour in their experiment. In
another study, Holm and Danielson (2005) found that survey items did not predict
behaviour in the trust game experiment in Tanzania. In Sweden on the other hand
they found survey items predicted trust behaviour. Ahmed and Salas (2009) also
attempted to examine the self-report and behaviour relationship of trust in a
cross-cultural study (Chile, Colombia, India, Mexico and Sweden). Their general
trust item was able to predict trust behaviour in Colombia alone. Results from
behavioural trust in strangers suggested that behavioural trust (across conditions) in
strangers was influenced by reciprocity or trustworthiness as manipulated by
generosity of the opponent.

Results presented in the present study draws attention to the need to cautiously
interpret results from trust research. Narrowing in on the main focus of the present
study – trust in strangers – it appears self-report and behavioural measures of trust
are influenced differently. Self-report trust appeared to have been influenced by a
distal contextual factor, namely, perception of nepotism in public institutions.
Behavioural trust seemed to have been influenced by a proximate factor, namely,
generosity of the trustee. This pattern is consistent with current literature. Explaining
results that pointed to the un-relatedness of self-report and behavioural measures,
Ahmed and Salas (2009) draw on current theory of trust, which postulates micro and
macro level trust. They suggest that self-report trust is influenced at the macro level
while behavioural trust is influenced at the micro level. Buegelsdijk (2006) citing
Luhman (1979) maintains that micro-level trust arises from emotional bonds
individuals form while macro-level trust is based on institutional environment of
laws and norms. Ahmed and Salas (2009) argue that self-report measures may
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measure trust on the macro-level, whereas behavioural measurements may examine
trust at the micro-level. Self-report and behaviour measures of trust in strangers
examined in the present study exhibits a pattern consistent with Ahmed and Salas’s
explanation.

Findings in the current work have shown that perception of nepotism in public
institutions may be serving as a macro-level contextual influence on the self-report
measure of trust in strangers. Generosity also played the role of a micro-level
influence on behavioural trust in both samples. It should be noted however that
emotional bonds could not have played a role in the behavioural measure of trust in
strangers in the present study. Participants did not have face-to-face interactions with
their opponents. Besides, interaction was limited to transfers only; therefore forming
emotional attachments (with their opponent) would have been unlikely. Experimental
decisions in the trust game used here could reasonably have been made at the
cognitive level not affect. Still trustworthiness, as maipulated by the generosity of the
simulated player, presents a sensible case as a micro-level influence.

Previous theorizing (Buegelsdijk, 2006; Ahmed & Salas, 2009) and findings
(Glaeser et al. 2001; Lazzarini et al. 2005; Ahmed & Salas, 2009) as well as results
presented in the current work call for the need to style trust research design more
efficiently. Even though evidence suggesting self-report and behaviour measures
target trust differently is still at its infancy, it would behoove trust research to exploit
this finding to benefit more fine-tuned analyses. In this regard trust research aimed at
investigating macro-level phenomena such as social capital or that aimed at
informing policy should focus on self-report measures of trust. Behavioural measures
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of trust may be directed at areas such as organizational psychology where
micro-level influences are more practical and essential.

6.4. Limitations and future directions
The prime aim of the present research was to investigate the nature and
explanations for differences between Ghanaians and Hong Kong Chinese on trust
vested in strangers. Self-report measures revealed that perception of nepotism in
public institutions plays an important role in determining trust toward strangers
regardless of how trust in strangers is conceptualized. Behaviour measures on the
other had presented counterintuitive results. First, Ghanaians exhibited more
behavioural trust than their Hong Kong Chinese counterparts. This was
counterintuitive because Ghanaians reported higher levels of perceived nepotism
which should result in Ghanaians exhibiting lower beahvioural trust. Secondly,
behavioural measures did not correlate with self-report measures of trust in strangers
and perceived nepotism in public institutions. The present data is therefore unable to
explain observed cultural differences in behavioural trust in strangers.

Two possible explanations for this finding is that a cultural level schema may
have been in play here, explaining why Ghanaians ended up transferring more points
during the trust game. Going back to self-report measures, it was found that
Ghanaians perceived their public institutions to be more nepotistic compared to
Hong Kong Chinese. It could be that functioning in a nepotistic context primed
Ghanaians toward ingratiating themselves to the other participant or using trust as a
strategy to secure favourable outcomes in case of future interaction. This behavioural
style among Ghanaians is seen more evidently in the thrifty opponent condition
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where Ghanaian participants express relatively stable levels of trust compared to
Hong Kong participants.

This could be mainly because they were unaware of the

number of available transfer opportunities. Hong Kong Chinese participants on the
other hand may not have felt the need to ingratiate as a personal strategy, as the
context in which they are functioning does not reward nepotism. Secondly, the nature
of trust in strangers as reported in the exploratory factor analysis showed that
Ghanaians associate trust in strangers with familiar others. Hong Kong Chinese on
the other hand associate trust in strangers with unfamiliar others. This could also
have induced Ghanaians to express more behavioural trust in strangers in the trust
game. The data obtained is unfortunately unable to ascertain this speculation.

Future research may explore the function of trustworthiness (whether
manipulated or not) more comprehensively in both survey and experimental design.
Current literature has focused extensively on trust but findings are consistently
showing the importance of exploring trustworthiness and the dynamics that underlie
the phenomenon in trust venturing. Manipulating trustworthiness via alternative
strategies (besides reciprocity and generosity) such as reputation and consistency of
promise credibility will further unpack the dynamics of trust.

Research, as in the present study, is increasingly finding inconsistent results in
trust research when it comes to self-report and behaviour measures of trust. This calls
for the need to conduct multilevel analyses, using representative samples, with
systematically integrated behavioural and self-report measures not forgetting the use
of targeted trust items. Moreover, experimental designs of the trust game must
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endeavor to make contextual artefacts (e.g. nepotism in public institutions) other than
characteristics of the opponent more salient.

Experimental designs that ensure the saliency of other pertinent context effects
in the trust game may reveal possible relationships between behavioural and
self-report trust. Bellemare and Kroger (2003) remark that the predictive power of
survey measures of trust are inextricably linked to the design of the trust game as
well as the information experimenters pose on their participants. Since this study
suggests that self-reporting retains cultural context influence, an attempt to prime
such influences in the trust game will be beneficial to uncovering obscured
relationships between self-reporting and behavioural measurement. The simplest and
most objective way to introduce the salience of cultural context in the trust game will
be to manipulate it via information posed on participants at the start of the game. For
example, to make perceived nepotism in public institutions salient in the present
study participants could have been asked to spend some time reflecting on their
experiences with public institutions in their country before going on to play the game.
This addition may help throw more light on the relationship between self-report and
behaviour measures of trust.

Also, using multilevel analysis will further unpack how contexts influence
behaviour and self-report trust. The present work’s student sample profile while
providing important insights cannot be generalized too widely. Representative
samples will further aid extensive generalization and also examine relationships that
may exist between self-report and behavioural trust. Additionally, using targeted
trust items will eliminate ambiguities and confounds that obscure the psychological
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correlates in trust measurement. The clear picture provided by such studies will aid
accurate generalization of trust research.

6.5. Conclusions
The present study has made some contributions and practical applications worth
noting. The unique contribution made by the present study is its focus on trust in
strangers as opposed to a generalized form of trust. As previously discussed
generalized trust assesses trust directed at both familiar and unfamiliar others. This
obscures extending findings from generalized assessments of trust to inform the
advantages to be reaped from trusting strangers. Targeted assessments of trust – trust
in strangers as examined in the current research streamlines the extension of findings
to inform the benefits to be gained from trusting strangers.

Furthermore the present work has highlighted the important role of public
institutions in creating an environment that encourages trust toward strangers. A
significant partial mediation with perceived nepotism in public institutions as a
mediator, explained observed cultural differences in trust in strangers. This showed
that if public institutions are perceived to be fair and egalitarian thereby promoting a
context of non-exploitation and trustworthiness, trust in strangers is encouraged. It
should however be noted that since the present work showed a partial mediation
other potential mediators such as ones trust disposition could provide insights on
how trust in strangers is engendered. Stolle (2002) has noted that no single source of
trust is all-encompassing in its explanatory power.
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This study has also highlighted the need to be cautions when interpreting results
from behavioural and self-report trust. The main reason for this is that the two
assessments seem to be influenced differently. Self-report trust influenced more by
the socio-cultural context while behavioural trust is influenced more by the
proximate impact of the characteristics (trustworthiness) of the individual or entity
being interacted with. The design of the trust game could be implicated in this
disparity as it restricts the context of the game making trustworthiness the sole
influence on behavioural trust in the game. To surmise, this work has contributed to
the ever-evolving trust literature by investigating the antecedents and conceptions of
trust in strangers.
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Appendix 1: Pairwise comparisons of the main effect of transfers.
(I) Transfers

(J) Transfers

1

2
3
1
3
1
2

2
3

Mean Difference
(I-J)
-.56
-1.82
.56
-1.27
1.82
1.27
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P value
.002
.000
.002
.000
.000
.000

Appendix 2: Comparison of Ghana and Hong Kong on confidence in public
institutions. World Value Survey. Wave 5 (2005-2008).
Ghana
Police
Parliament
The civil service
The government
*p < .0001

Ghana
Hong Kong

M
2.42
2.21
2.25
2.05

Hong Kong
M
SD
2.06
.56
2.50
.62
2.39
.59
2.42
.65

SD
.99
.87
.84
.88

Most people can be Can’t be too
trusted
careful
130
1397
505
725

X2 (1) = 407.00, p < .0001.
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df
2756
2689
2668
2735

Total
1527
1230

t
11.13*
-9.76*
-5.06*
-12.06*

Appendix 3: World Governance Indicators: reports aggregate and individual
governance indicators for 215 economies over the period 1996–2013

Estimate
Rule of law
Control of corruption
Government
effectiveness

1.54
1.63
1.73

Hong Kong
Rank
Data
sources
91
10
92
10
95.69
7

Estimate

Ghana
Rank

0.11
-0.07
-0.09

56
56.46
50.72

Data
sources
17
15
12

Estimate: Ranges from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong).
Rank: Percentile rank among all countries (ranges from 0 (lowest) to 100 (highest)
rank).
Data sources: Number of data sources on which estimate is based.
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Appendix 4: Bilingual Questionnaire
Informed consent statement
I am a research postgraduate student at the Department of Applied
Psychology, Lingnan University and currently conducting research on
students’ investment behaviour. Your participation in this study is deeply
appreciated.
This study consists of two sessions and will take
approximately 20minutes to complete. The first session is a "points
exchange game", which involves trading points with another participant.
Participants who score high number of points would enter a lucky draw
to win a prize. If you wish to enter this draw, kindly input your email
address at the start of the game. Your email will ONLY be used as a
means of contact, in the event that you win the prize. Your information
will NEVER be disclosed to any third party. The second session is a
survey. The information you provide in this study will only be used
for research purposes. All personal data will be treated with strict
confidentiality. Your participation is entirely voluntary. During the
research you are free to withdraw at any point before your data have
been collected. Such decision has no implication to your school
grades. Thank you for participating in this study; your participation is
vital to this research. Should you have any questions regarding this study,
you may contact David Neequaye (Tel: (852) 69273929 / email:
davidamonneequaye@ln.hk)
本人是嶺南大學應用心理學系的研究生，現正就學生投資行
為進行研究。非常感謝您的參與。
研究分為兩部分，需時約二
十分鐘。第一部分是交換點數遊戲，您將與另一位參與者交換點數。
取得高點數的參與者將被安排參與抽獎。若您希望參加抽獎，請於
遊戲開始時鍵入你的電郵地址。您的電郵衹會於您得獎時作聯絡用
途， 我們絕不會向任何人仕透露您的電郵。研究的第二部分是問卷
調查。

您於此研究提供的資料將衹被用於學術研究用途。所有

個人資料將嚴格保密。您的參與全屬自願；無論您參與與否，或於
研究任何階段中止參與，此決定均不會在任何方面影響您的學業成
績。
感謝您參與本研究，您的參與對此項研究非常重要。若您
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對 本研 究有 任何問 題， 請聯 絡 David
Neequaye ( 電 話 : (852)
69273929 / 電郵: davidamonneequaye@ln.hk)
 I am clear about the purposes of this research and agree to participate
in this study. (1)
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Bilingual questionnaire
Kindly input your questionnaire number.
On a scale from 0-10, to what extent do you think the other participant in
the Investment Game was a real opponent? 以 1－10 分作評分，您有
多認為在投資遊戲中的是真實的對手？
 0 (0)
 1 (1)
 2 (2)
 3 (3)
 4 (4)
 5 (5)
 6 (6)
 7 (7)
 8 (8)
 9 (9)
 10 (10)
On a scale from 0-10, to what extent do you think the other participant
was generous? 以 1－10 分作評分，您認為另一位參與者的慷慨程度
是？
 0 (0)
 1 (1)
 2 (2)
 3 (3)
 4 (4)
 5 (5)
 6 (6)
 7 (7)
 8 (8)
 9 (9)
 10 (10)
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To what extent do you think that the treatment people get from the
Police force in [R’s Country] depends on who they know? 香港警方給
予人的待遇會有多大程度是取決於他們的人事關係 ?
 Definitely does 肯定會 (1)
 Probably does 可能會 (2)
 Neutral 中立 (3)
 Probably does not 可能不會 (4)
 Definitely does not 肯定不會 (5)

To what extent do you think that the treatment people get from the
Courts in [R’s Country] depends on who they know? 香港法院給予人
的待遇會有多大程度是取決於他們的人事關係
 Definitely does 肯定會 (1)
 Probably does 可能會 (2)
 Neutral 中立 (3)
 Probably does not 可能不會 (4)
 Definitely does not 肯定不會 (5)
To what extent do you think that the treatment people get from the
government in [R’s Country] depends on who they know? 香港政府給
予人的待遇會有多大程度是取決於他們的人事關係 ?
 Definitely does 肯定會 (1)
 Probably does 可能會 (2)
 Neutral 中立 (3)
 Probably does not 可能不會 (4)
 Definitely does not 肯定不會 (5)
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To what extent do you think that the treatment people get from the
legislative council in [R’s Country] depends on who they know? 香港
立法會給予人的待遇會有多大程度是取決於他們的人事關係 ?
 Definitely does 肯定會 (1)
 Probably does 可能會 (2)
 Neutral 中立 (3)
 Probably does not 可能不會 (4)
 Definitely does not 肯定不會 (5)

To what extent do you think that the treatment people get from the Civil
service in [R’s Country] depends on who they know? 香港公務員給予
人的待遇會有多大程度是取決於他們的人事關係 ?
 Definitely does 絕對是 (1)





Probably does 很可能是 (2)
Neutral 中立 (3)
Probably does not 很可能不是 (4)
Definitely does not 絕對不是 (5)
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Indicate the degree to which you trust people from the following groups
請標明您對以下群體成員的信任程度。
Do not
Do not
trust at
trust
very
all 完全
不信任 much 不
甚信任
(1)
(2)
1. Your
family 您
的家庭
(1)
2. People
you know
personally
您認識的
人 (2)

Neutral
中立 (3)

Trust
somewhat
有些信任
(4)

Trust
completely
完全信任
(5)





















3. People
you meet
for the first
time 第一
次見面的
人 (3)











4. People
of another
religion 其
他宗教的
人 (4)











People of
another
nationality
其他國藉
的人 (5)
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Appendix 5: Instructions to trust game
Welcome to the POINTS EXCHANGE GAME!
In the next section, you will be automatically paired with another participant
who is currently taking part in this study, at the same time as you.
在下一個部份，你將會跟另一位與您同時參與這項研究的參加者進行自動配
對。
1. You will be engaging in a POINTS EXCHANGING GAME with the other
participant, this exercise is designed to examine investment behaviour in
students.
你將會與另一位參加者進行一個點數交換遊戲，這次活動的目的是在於了解學
生的投資取向。
2. After the whole study is over, participants with high number of points may
win a prize. Such participants will be contacted via email.
當整個研究結束後，獲得高點數的參加者們會自動參與抽獎。得獎者將會收到
有關電郵通知領獎。
INSTRUCTIONS
You both have 10(ten) points to start with and will be engaging in SEVERAL
EXCHANGES.
兩位參加者均獲分配 10 個積分點去開始玩這個遊戲。在整個過程當中，你將
會有幾次機會跟對方交換點數。
The sequence of your exchange will be determined by the computer system...
電腦系統將決定你們交換點數的先後次序...
[after 10 seconds]
YOU have been selected to be the FIRST to make the point transfer in this session.
你被選中在此環節中首先作點數轉讓。
Note:
At every stage, you will first transfer any number between 0(zero)and 10(ten) of
points to the other participant. The number of points you transfer to the other
participant will be doubled for him or her. For example, if you transfer 5 points to
the other participant, it means that he or she will get 10 points in that transfer.
在每一次的交換過程當中，你將會先轉讓從 0（零）到 10（十）之中的任何數
量的點數給另一位參加者。對方在該次交換中真正得到的點數將會是你所轉讓
的點數的兩倍。假設你轉讓 5 點給對方, 他/ 她將會得到 10 點。
Then, the other participant will transfer any number between 0(zero) and 10(ten)of
points back to you. The total number of points the other participant transfers to you
will be doubled for you. For example, if he or she transfers 5 points to you, it means
that you will get 10 points in that transfer.
然後, 另一位參加者也將會轉讓從 0（零）到 10（十）之中的任何數量的點數
給你。你在該次交換中真正得到的點數將會是他/她所轉讓給你的數目的兩倍。
假設對方轉讓 5 點給你, 你將會得到 10 點。
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Please be reminded that the more points you get, the more likely it would be for you
to enter the lucky draw.
請記著, 你所得的積分愈多, 你能夠參與抽獎的機會將會愈大。

Screenshot of an excerpt of the trust game
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